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8UMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The over-all purpose of this study is to investigate the inter-relation-
ships between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors during the process 
of economic development, with some particular attention to the effects of 
food aid. The major portion of the study is devoted to a theoretical analysis 
of these intersectoral relationships. A five-sector, optimizing model of an 
underdeveloped, dual economy is formulated and extensively analyzed. The five 
sectors include subsistence or traditional agriculture, commercial agricultur~ 
manufacturing goods production, capital goods production, and a government 
sector. Three products are produced: agricultural goods, which can only be 
consumed, manufacturing goods which can either be consumed or used as non-
durable factors of production, and capital goods, which can only be used as 
durable factors of production. 
The factors of production included in the model are land, labor, capital, 
and manufactured inputs. Production in the traditional agricultural sector 
requires land, labor, and manufactured inputs; production in the commercial 
agricultural sector requires capital goods in addition to the factors employed 
in the subsistence sector. Manufactured goods and capital goods production do 
not require land as an input and employ only labor, manufactured inputs, and 
capital as factors. Labor is assumed to be employed at a constant wage rate 
(measured in terms of manufactured goods) in the commercial agricultural 
sector, the manufacturing goods sector, and the capital goods sector. Any 
labor that cannot earn its marginal value productivity in these three sectors 
is employed in the subsistence sector at a lower wage rate. 
ii 
Two formulations of the model are considered, a centralized and a de-
centralized model, with the role of the government being the principal 
difference between the two models. In the first formulation, the government 
has control over four investment alternatives. These four alternatives are 
investment in social overhead capital in either the subsistence or commercial 
agricultural sectors and investment in "private" capital in either the manu-
facturing or the capital goods sectors. In the second formulation, the 
government's role is expanded considerably to include control over the allo-
cation of private investment funds as well as public tax revenue. 
These two versions of the model are extensively analyzed in an attempt 
to discern the economic and physical characteristics of an economy that would 
tend to make it socially desirable to develop agriculture relative to industr~ 
and vice versa. Similarly, an attempt is made to delineate the conditions 
under which food aid has the most positive effect on agricultural development, 
employment and consumer welfare. A detailed descriptive summary of the con-
clusions of the study follow. 
1. Public investment in subsistence agriculture. In an economy with a 
given resource base, capital stock, level of technology, and wage-price 
configuration, the proportion of the labor force engaged in subsistence em-
ployment will increase as the size of the labor force increases. This is 
true since, for a given level of wages and prices and a fixed productive 
capacity, only a limited number of jobs are available in advanced sectors. 
Thus, as the ratio of labor to resource base increases, the proportion of the 
labor force in the subsistence sector also increases. 
It is demonstrated later that, as the proportion of the labor force 
employed in subsistence agriculture increases, it becomes relatively more 
important to increase the productivity of this sector. There is no a priori 
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reason to suggest that there should not be a net inflow of savings into the 
subsistence sector if the proportion of the labor force employed in this 
sector is large enough. Co~versely, there is no reason to suggest that the 
subsistence agricultural sector should not be used as a source of savings to 
finance nonagricultural development in an economy with a different resource 
endowment, labor force distribution, and capital structure. Whether there 
should be a net inflow of savings into subsistence agriculture will depend 
on the individual country concerned and the relevant data and parameters 
pertaining to that country. The following characteristics, however, may be 
itemized as relevant to the decision regarding investment in the subsistence 
sector. 
The first and most obvious consideration is the physical productivity of 
the investment project. Ceteris paribus, the physically more productive an 
investment project, the greater is the likelihood that it will be a desirable 
undertaking. The productivity of a particular investment may crucially 
depend on one or more related investments. For example, an extension program 
extolling the virtues of a new crop variety may have an extremely low payoff 
if the necessary complementary fertilizer is not available. If the appropri-
ate investment in providing fertilizer also is made, the same extension 
program may have a very high payoff. Considerations such as these have led to 
package approaches for agricultural development. 
The physical productivity of an investment project is not, however, the 
only consideration in investment decisions. Productivity must be weighted 
by an appropriate value which is placed on the output. In this study, the 
social value of the output, reflected by the social welfare function, is used 
as the weighting factor (a) in the decision criteria for allocating govern-
ment funds in both the centralized and decentralized models and (b) in the 
iv 
allocation of private savings in the centralized model. However, prices are 
used to value the output in decisions regarding the allocation of private 
savings in the decentralized model. It is demonstrated for a closed economy 
with a given level of consumer income that both the social value and price 
of agricultural output relative to nonagricultural output will increase as the 
ratio of the consumption of agricultural goods to manufactured goods declines. 
It also is suggested that this result will not necessarily hold if the decline 
in the ratio of agricultural:nonagricultural goods consumption is accompanied 
by an increase in real income. Then the social valuations will move in favor 
of the agricultural sector only if the rate of decline in the consumption 
ratio is sufficient to offset the influence of Engel's law at higher income 
levels. This suggests that, as the economy achieves higher levels of output 
in both agricultural and nonagricultural production, investment in agriculture 
might become relatively less desirable than at lower levels of output. This 
statement does not mean that investment in agriculture is undesirable at 
higher income levels, nor does it mean that it is desirable to invest in 
agriculture at lower income levels. 
It is assumed that public investment in the subsistence sector involves 
employing labor of this sector at a higher wage rate than it was previously 
earning; where this is true, the social desirability of investing in the 
subsistence sector tends to increase as the disparity between the government 
wage rate and the subsistence wage rate widens. This condition is consistent 
with the condition of diminishing marginal utility, together these conditions 
affect the social benefit derived from investments in subsistence agriculture. 
Whether this investment should be tnade depends on the size of the anticipated 
social benefit relative to the social opportunity cost of using resources in 
this manner. This criterion differs from the conventional cost-benefit anal-
v 
ysis where anticipated actual costs are compared with anticipated returns. 
Actual costs of a project may differ substantially from the opportunity costs 
of using the resources in this manner. These conclusions are obtained from an 
analysis of the decentralized economymodel. Similar results are derived from 
the centralized model. 
Throughout this investigation it was assumed that investment in social 
overhead capital in subsistence agriculture has no productivity influences on 
the commercial agricultural sector or vice versa. This is a fairly realistic 
assumption for some forms of investment. For example, an irrigation system 
may be built to provide water for either subsistence producers or commercial 
producers. Under the assumption that there is no complementarity between 
sectors, investment in social overhead capital specific to the subsistence 
sector becomes realtively more desirable as the amount of labor employed in 
subsistence agriculture increases relative to that employed in commercial 
agriculture. Similarly, the larger the proportion of cultivated area used in 
subsistence agriculture, the more desirable the investment in this sector 
becomes relative to investment in commercial agriculture. 
Investing in either commercial- or subsistence-sector social overhead 
capital in one period reduces the relative social desirability of investing 
in that sector in the subsequent periods. Increased output resulting from 
public investment in either of these sectors reduces the relative social 
value of agricultural production. Hence, investing in the subsistence sector 
in one period also reduces the desirability of investing in commercial 
agriculture in subsequent periods and vice versa. 
2. Private capital accumulation. The conclusions in this section are 
derived from the centralized model. Two constructs of this model are possi-
ble. First, the government owns all the reproducible capital stock and rents 
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it to entrepreneurs, and rent collected is used to accumulate more capital. 
Second, the capital is privately owned and the income earned by the capital-
owners is used to accumulate more capital according to guidelines determined 
by the central planning authorities. Regardless of the construct, savings are 
referred to as private savings (as compared with public savings out of taxes) 
and are allocated among investment alternatives in a manner consistent with 
maximizing welfare over the planning horizon. 
The allocation of investment funds to expand capacity in capital goods 
as opposed to consumer-goods industries involves a difficult intertemporal 
comparison. Satisfactions to be derived from expanded present versus future 
consumption must be estimated. Capital investment in the capital goods in-
dustry requires additional periods of waiting (as compared with placing these 
capital goods in the agricultural or manufacturing goods sectors). Higher 
rates of future consumption require sacrifice of current consumption. Thus, 
expansion of the capital goods industry will be desirable from society's 
standpoint if incomes are not too low and consumers are not too impatient. In 
countries where pressures exist for immediate improvements in living standards, 
emphasis on expansion of the capital goods sector will be less. Conversely, 
when income is higher and more emphasis is placed on longer-run improvements 
in living standards, the social payoff for increasing capacity in the capital 
goods industry will be greater. 
If the productivity in a particular sector increases more rapidly than in 
other sectors, the social desirability of investing in this sector will in-
crease if there are no adverse effects on terms of trade. This condition 
prevails whether the productivity increases arise from investments in infra-
structure or through the adoption of new techniques developed in advanced 
countries. 
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3. Population growth and economic development. The supply of labor has, 
to this point, been assumed to be perfectly inelastic with respect to the wage 
rate. Relaxing this assumption has no essential effect on the conclusions, 
although the magnitudes of some policies' impacts may be dampened. For 
example, if the labor supply is elastic, an expansion of government employment 
will have a smaller impact on the incomes of laborers in the subsistence 
sector. 
The effects of an increased population depend on the magnitude of the 
population growth rate relative to (a) the size and growth rate of the 
capital stock and (b) the rate of technological improvement. If the popula-
tion growth rate is too high relative to these changes, per-capita production 
and consumption will remain constant or decline, even though total production 
is increased. This underscores the importance of combining policies to con-
trol the rate of population growth with policies to promote economic develop-
ment. 
4. Intracountry effects of food aid. The principal commodity of U.S. 
foreign aid has been food. Some effects of food aid are analyzed below within 
a comparative static, partial equilibrium model. It can be viewed as a sub-
model of the centralized model. Problems associated with repayment of loans 
based on food aid are not considered. To investigate those types of problems 
requires a somewhat more comprehensive model than employed in this study. 
Specifically, a foreign sector must be included to incorporate foreign ex-
change earnings. Another study in this series deals with methods of repayment 
and fiscal aspects of concessional sales as they relate to economic develop-
ment and economic stability. 
The impact of three alternative methods of food distribution are consider 
sidered: Under the first, food is given as an outright grant to consumers. 
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Under the second, food is used by the government as wages-in-kind for labor 
employed on Social Overhead Capital (SOC) projects. The third method supposes 
that the government sells the food in the market at prevailing prices, revenue 
generated by the food sales being added to the general tax budget. 
The intraperiod relationships between prices and quantities of agricul-
tural goods under the three distribution methods can be compared diagramma-
tically in Figure 1. (p. ix). Demand and supply curves in the absence of aid 
are represented by the curves D and S , respectively. These demand and 
0 0 
supply schedules result in a price of P and quantity consumed of Q . 
0 0 
Distributing the food aid in the form of grants, A, results in the 
largest shift in the supply curve since employment in the subsistence sector 
remains unchanged. Thus, S = S + A where S represents the total supply g 0 , g 
curve. Granting food to consumers has the effect of bolstering effective 
aggregate consumer income. Hence, the demand schedule shifts to the right and 
is represented by curve D • The intersection of the resulting demand and g 
supply curves results in a price-quantity configuration where P < P and g 0 
Q < Q . The equilibrium price with food grants must be lower than without 
0 g 
them unless (a) the marginal propensity to consume food (out of income) is 
unity or (b) consumers affected are completely insulated from the market. 
In other words, if recipients of aid grants divert some of their income 
previously spent on food to nonfood commodities, a drop in food price will 
result. 
Turning now to distribution under work projects, the income effect of 
this distribution system is identical to that of direct grants and D = D • 
w g 
The domestic supply curve for food shifts to the left since labor is trans-
ferred from the subsistence sector to SOC projects. The leftward shift in 
the domestic supply curve, however, will not be sufficient to offset the 
ix 
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Figure 1. Prices and quantities of food consumed under alternative 
distribution methods 
X 
positive influence of the aid. Although the equilibrium quantity consumed is 
greater than in the absence of aid, the increase is less than when the food 
grants are given directly to consumers. This leads to equilibrium price and 
quantity, Pw and ~· with the characteristic P0 > Pw > Pg and Q0 < ~ < Qg. 
With food aid sold in the market place and the revenue, used to hire 
subsistence labor for SOC projects, the economy, is affected the same as when 
food is distributed as wages in kind, (we suppose the revenue earned from 
sales is all paid out in wages). If, however, the revenue from government 
food sales is used to purchase capital goods, the domestic supply schedule 
for agric u 1 t u r a 1 goods S , shift S to the left by a smaller amount than in 
s 
the case of distribution as wages in kind. The increased demand for capital 
goods draws labor from the subsistence sector. The leftward shift in the 
demand curve, D , is less since all additional food must be purchased from 
s 
income earned in employment. Income is augmented only if the increased pur-
chase of capital goods leads to increased employment in the capital goods 
industry where labor return is higher than in the subsistence sector. This 
income effect is smaller than that experienced with food aid distributed 
either as grants or as wages in kind. Hence D must lie between D and D • 
s 0 w 
For the same reason, the amount of labor removed from subsistence production 
is smaller if capital goods are purchased than if SOC projects are undertaken, 
and the new supply schedule S , must lie between S and S . The resulting 
s w g 
equilibrium price, Ps' and quantity, Qs' have the properties that P0 > Pw> Ps 
and Q < Q < Q . The equilibrium magnitude of P relative to P and Q rela-
o s g s g s 
tive to ~ will depend on the extent of the shifts in the supply and demand 
schedules. These orderings may change if the labor hired in each of these 
situations does not come from the subsistence agricultural sector and is 
hired from an urban or rural pool of unemployed workers. 
INTRODUCTION 
A central, unresolved issue in the investigation of the determinants of 
economic growth is the nature of the interrelationships between agricultural 
development and industrialization. In earlier studies of developmental prior-
ities, industrialization typically was emphasized as the means for successful 
economic development. Studies of the 1940s and 1950s advocated development 
for underemployed and unemployed labor and to increase the demand for agri-
cultural products. It was supposed that the industrial sector, as the leading 
sector, would pull the backward agricultural sector to higher levels of devel-
opment. Agriculture was considered largely passive in the developmental 
process. 
During the last decade, however, several theories of economic development 
and much empirical evidence have indicated that a significant role for agri-
culture may be appropriate in development. Increased emphasis now is being 
placed on developmental policies that exploit interrelationships between the 
industrial and agricultural sectors so as to promote mutual and simultaneous 
development. These studies propose that there is not a unique and best blend 
of agricultural development and industrialization for all countries. 1 The 
1Eicher and Witt [10, pp. 7-10], Meier [37, Ch. 6], Ruttan [54, pp. 1-2], 
Thorbecke [59, pp. 3-7], and Witt [66] express similar view. However, these 
views are not unanimously endorsed by either policy-makers or ecnomists. Enke 
goes so far as to suggest that " ••. most LDC (less-developed country) govern-
ments associate industrialization with development and hence favor an expan-
sion of industrial output that exceeds the ability of a neglected agriculture 
to support it." [11, p. 1127]. As another example, in 1968, Higgins wrote 
that "Economic development in the past has consisted very largely of trans-
ferring population from low-productivity agriculture to much higher productiv-
ity industrial occupations, thus reducing population pressure on the land and 
permitting agricultural improvement in the form of large-scale mechanized 
- 2 -
relative emphasis given to each should vary according to resource endowment 
and the phase of development of the particular country. 
Objectives 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature of the relation-
ships between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors during the process 
of agricultural development. In addition, the following specific objectives 
are pursued: 
1. To develop a rigorous, theoretical model encompassing as many 
agricultural-nonagricultural intersectoral relationships as consis-
tent with operationalism. 
2. To incorporate into this model as much realism or empirical rele-
vance as is possible within a rigorous, operational framework. 
3. To include the government as an integrated entity in the model. 
4. To use this model to analyze the optimal allocation of private 
and public (government) savings between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. 
5. To identify characteristics of economies that tend to make agricul-
tural development socially desirable relative to industrialization 
and vice versa. 
6. To investigate whether, and under what conditions, it is desirable 
to have a net inflow of savings into the agricultural sector. 
7. To analyze the impact of commodity aid and, in particular, food aid 
on the prices and quantities produced and on the investment priori-
ties within the economy. 
Footnote 1 continued from Page 1: agriculture at the same time" [17, p. 464-
465]. Higgins uses this as a basis for advocating industrialization as the 
"engine for growth. 11 
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8. To investigate the implications of alternative rates of population 
growth on the optimal investment priorities and development plans. 
Org~nization of the Study 
The following section is devoted to a nontechnical discussion of the 
agricultural development, industrialization issue. The immediately following 
section includes a review of some of the better-known arguments pertaining 
to this issue. It is followed by a brief discussion of alternative methods 
of analyzing the problem. We then present a heuristic description of the 
models developed in this study. The discussion immediately following primar-
ily is a nontechnical exposition of the methods of analysis. We follow with 
the formulation of a model termed the decentralized model. It is an optimizing 
model and the optimizing technique is after presentation of the model. A re-
formulation of the model then is made within a centralized-economy framework 
with results very similar to those obtained for a decentralized economy. In 
addition, a number of highly restrictive and unrealistic assumptions are re-
laxed through this reformulation. 
Industrialization and Agricultural Development 
Many of the arguments for either industrialization or agricultural 
development are doctrinaire. An argument in favor of industrialization is 
frequently viewed as an argument against agricultural development and vice 
versa. Although it is true that industry and agriculture compete for re-
sources, an argument in favor of one need not be an argument against the other 
because there are certain interrelationships and cotnplementarities between the 
two sectors which can and should be exploited. A brief review of some of the 
arguments in favor of industrialization and agricultural development, however, 
2 
may be useful. 
Industrialization 
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Some of the more common arguments in favor of industrialization in less-
developed areas are briefly outlined in this section. Not all are logically 
defensible arguments and some are based on erroneous assumptions. Some of 
these arguments are more appropriately considered to be emotional or passion-
ate appeals favoring industrialization. 
Perhaps the most common argument presented in favor of industrialization 
is the high correlation in various countries between per capita income and 
the proportion of the labor force employed in nonagricultural activities. 
Economic history suggests that rising per capita incomes have always been 
accompanied by a reduction in the relative size of the agricultural labor 
3 force. Similarly, the proportion of the total output originating from the 
. 1 1 d d 1. •t . . 4 agr1cu tura sector ten s to ec 1ne as per cap1 a 1ncome 1ncreases. Thus, 
economic development is associated with industrialization. Prebisch goes so 
2No attempt has been made at completeness. When this study was essen-
tially completed, a relevant survey article by Johnston [20] appeared with 
fairly extensive bibliography. Interested readers may consult his biblio-
graphy for additional references. 
3see for example, Ojala [46], or the massive works of Clark [8]. 
Zimmerman conducted a cross-sectional study in which he regressed the log of 
per capita income (y) on the percentage of the labor force (x) employed in 
nonprimary (secondary and tertiary) sectors for a number of economic-geographic 
regions and various points in time. He found the relationship log y = 0.0202x 
+ 1.3235, with a high correlation (R=0.92). As Zimmerman indicates, however, 
this does not imply causation. A country need not be poor because a large 
portion of the population is in the agricultural sector. See Zimmerman [67, 
ch. 3]. Conversely, industrialization and the accompanying structural changes 
areneithernecessary nor sufficient conditions for increasing per capita income. 
Viner [62, ch. 3] is very critical of this type of argument, which Ruttan 
[53, p. 19] has called the structural transformation hypothesis. 
4 See for example, Kuznets [30, pp. 43-58]. Additional references can be 
found in Johnston [20]. 
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far as to state that " .•• industrialization is an inescapable part of the 
process of change accompanying a gradual improvement in per capita income" 
[48, p. 251]. 
Along similar lines, Myrdal [41, p. 1151] suggests that the very rapid 
development of industry through government planning in the Soviet Union has 
had a very important influence on planning activities in many countries in 
South Asia. An economy centered around a comprehensive and heavy industrial 
structure is widely accepted by many leaders as an obvious target for attain-
ment by an underdeveloped country. Soviet experiences in planning provide 
the illustration for leaders in many countries. 5 
A compelling and logical reason for industrialization in some developing 
countries is the prospect of foreign exchange to allow imports of manufactured 
goods. Bhagwati suggests that, "It is possible to argue that poor countries 
should continue producing primary products only if it can be established that 
they could always earn enough foreign exchange to import their manufactures. 
Where this is not so, industrialization is a rational consequence" [3, p. 165]. 
The implicit assumption in this argument is that industrialization will improve 
the balance of payments position either through import substitution or by 
6 
expanding exports. However, Myrdal suggests that, "Import substitution may 
ease the foreign exchange position in the long run, but in the short run it 
5This argument suffers from the same logical weakness as the structural 
transformation hypothesis. Success with this method in the Soviet Union does 
not mean repeating the same process elsewhere will produce similar results. 
6Bhagwati uses the following example to illustrate the necessity of 
investing in heavy industry (such as steel plants). If a country wants to 
invest $250 million in plant and equipment (e.g. tractor and fertilizer plants) 
in a particular year, but only expects to earn $100 million in foreign exchang~ 
the only possibility for carrying out the investment program is to produce the 
necessary plant and equipment [3, p. 166-168]. In this example, there is an 
implicit assumption that using the limited foreign exchange earnings to estab-
lish heavy industry will allow the investment program to be successfully 
executed. 
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usually aggravates it" [41, p. 1161]. This consequence arises because short-
run imports of capital goods are usually required to establish import-substi-
tution industries. The establishment of import substitution industries need 
not ease the balance of payments situation if raw materials must be imported 
to manufacture the import substitutes. 
Industrialization also is cited as a means to raise the productivity of 
the labor force. Generally the product per worker in agriculture is below 
that of the economy as a whole in both developed and underdeveloped countries. 
The disparity in less-developed nations seems even greater. 7 Industrialization 
thus is suggested as a means to increase the portion of the labor force in 
the more productive, nonagricultural sectors. Additionally, an indirect 
influence may be realized and since, due to limited land area, agriculture is 
subject to diminishing returns. Transferring labor from agriculture reduces 
the labor/land ratio and should raise labor productivity. This possibility is 
limited when there is so much labor in the agriculture that its marginal 
physical productivity is zero. Labor then can be withdrawn without a con-
comitant reduction in agricultural production. The assumed pool of redundant 
labor in agriculture in the form of disguised unemployment led to great 
optimism for developmental possibilities during the 1950s. 8 
7see, for example, the works by Bellerby [2] and Kuznets [29, pp. 415-417]. 
Kuznets makes the additional observation that the ratio of population to labor 
force in the agricultural sector is higher than for the nonagricultural sectors. 
Consequently, the disparity of product per capita between the sectors is even 
greater than the disparity of product per worker. Myrdal [41, p. 1157] points 
out that since the capital:labor ratio in manufacturing usually is higher than 
in traditional agriculture there is some question concerning the meaning of 
comparisons of product per worker between manufacturing and agriculture. 
8The implications for the development of an economy with "surplus" labor: 
in the sense of zero marginal physical productivity of labor in the subsistence 
sectors was first discussed by Lewis [33]. There has been a great deal of 
controversy over the assumption of surplus labor. After surveying the relevant 
literature, Kao, Anschel, and Eicher conclude that, "To date, there is little 
reliable empirical evidence to support the existence of more than token -
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Closely related to the productivity argument is the notion that industri-
alization will create new jobs and result in employment for unemployed members 
of the labor force. The provision of new jobs is deemed extremely important 
in less-developed nations where the population and labor force are 
expanding very rapidly. Widespread unemployment is considered to result from 
the failure of capital and complementary means of production to increase at 
9 the same rate as the labor supply. The proposed solution is to increase the 
rate of capital accumulation. While employment creation is frequently used 
as an argument in favor of industrialization, the number of jobs created often 
is insufficient to absorb the natural increase in the labor force. Typically, 
industrial employment starts from a base which is very small relative to the 
10 total labor force. 
Another view holds industrialization to be crucial to development because 
it radiates stimuli throughout the economy. Establishment of an industry will 
generate a demand for inputs which are not produced domestically because of 
Footnote 8 continued from Page 6: five percent - disguised unemployment in 
under-developed countries as defined by a zero marginal product of labor and 
the condition of ceteris paribus" [26, p. 141]. 
9see, for example, Navarrete and Navarrete [42]. Under strictly neo-
classical assumptions with flexible wage rates and prices, there is no 
reason for any labor to be unemployed even with a rapidly expanding labor 
force. For an excellent analysis of why unemployment may continue to persist 
in less-developed economies, see Eckaus [9]. 
10Myrdal cites several statements from the development plans of Burma, 
India, Pakistan, and Ceylon indicating the awareness of planning authorities 
in those countries where industrialization does not create very many new jobs. 
In addition to not creating many new positions, industrialization also tends 
to have "backwash" effects on existing industry, especially cottage industry. 
Myrdal concludes that, although the estimates made by the planners are crude, 
" •.. an important conclusion about the employment-creating potential of indus-
trial expansion can be sustained by the statistical calculations of govern-
ments - namely, that industrial expansion, when beginning from a low base, 
cannot directly have more than a peripheral uplifting effect on (occupational) 
participation ratios during a very considerable early perio~' [41, p. 1199, 
1172 -1205]. 
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insufficient demand. The additional demand resulting from the establishment 
of industry provides an incentive to establish an import substitution industry. 
This type of stimulus has become known as a backward linkage. In addition to 
backward linkages, forward linkages or stimuli may also be operative if indus-
'd d h. h . f h . 11 try prov1 es pro ucts w 1c requ1re urt er process1ng. 
A second type of stimulus also has been cited as an argument in favor of 
industrialization: The increased incomes from new industries leads to in-
creased demand for consumer goods. These, in turn, result in expanded markets 
and, hence, provide additional profitable investment opportunities. These 
considerations are used to argue that initiation of investment projects in a 
number of industries at the sa<11e time is desirable and even necessary to make 
investments in the individual industries more profitable. This thesis has 
12 become known as the balanced growth argument. 
Greater income frotu industrialization is proposed to have an addition-
al positive feature. The volume of savings is expected to be larger with 
higher income levels. Hence, additional investments should become progres-
sively easier if, as is often assumed, the saving rate rises with higher per 
. . 13 
cap1ta 1ncomes. 
11 An extensive discussion of the importance and nature of linkage can be 
found in Hirschman [18]. Regarding the industrialization issue, Hirschman 
concludes that agriculture in particular has very weak linkage effects and that 
" .•. the superiority of manufacturing in this respect is crushing. This may yet 
be the most important reason militating against any complete specialization of 
under-developed countries in primary production" [18, p. 110]. 
12 Many versions of the balanced growth argument have been presented. The 
demand version was first discussed by Rosenstein-Rodan [50] and later popular-
ized by Nurkse [45]. For a criticism of the balanced growth argument, see 
Hirschman [18, Ch. 3]. 
13The importance of this point has been emphasized by many writers. For 
example, Rostow [51, p. 281] regards raising the net saving rate in less-
developed countries to over 10 percent of national income as a necessary (but 
not sufficient) condition for take-off into self-sustained growth. See also 
Lewis [33, p. 155]. 
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Industrialization also is promoted for political reasons. Two reasons are 
frequently cited. First, in the interests of national security, a certain 
amount of self-sufficiency in manufactured and capital goods production may be 
desirable. Second, many ne~ly independent countries have a strong desire to 
reverse colonial economic patterns 'based on export of primary products and 
import of consumer goods for local consumption. 14 Many countries place heavy 
emphasis on industrialization in their development plans to circumvent this 
15 pattern. 
It is sometimes argued that industrialization conditions cultural values 
16 in a manner that favors further development. Industrialization supposedly 
modernizes the outlook of individuals and creates a more suitable environment 
for technological progress. 
Thus, a milieu of economic, sociological, political, and historical 
factors may interact to make industrialization attractive as a policy. It 
does not, however, make industrialization imperative. There may well be 
certain underdeveloped countries that will find specialization in traditional 
and primary production to be profitable. Some of the reasons favoring agri-
cultural development are reviewed in the following section. 
Agricultural Development 
An obvious reason for emphasizing agricultural development in less-
developed economies is its contribution to the growth of total and per capita 
14Myrdal [41, pp. 1151-1152] refers to this as the Communist doctrine of 
colonial exploitation. 
15The failure of industry to develop under laissez-faire policies is one 
of the arguments advanced to justify development planning. See Meier 
[37, Ch. 8]. 
16An interesting attempt to empirically identify the relative importance 
of certain social and political elements on the potential for economic devel-
opment has been made by Adelman and Morris [1]. 
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product. In many less-developed economies, agriculture frequently contributes 
from 40 to 50 percent of the net output and employs over half the labor 
17 force. If agricultural output does not increase, the rate of growth of 
national income will fall short of growth in nonagricultural income. With 
the advent of the green revolution in agriculture, the possibilities for 
tremendous increases in agricultural productivity and output has led to in-
18 
creased emphasis of agriculture as a source of growth. Also, failure to 
increase productivity in agriculture will tend to skew the Lorenz curve even 
further, unless the creation of employment opportunities in nonagricultural 
pursuits permits sufficient migration of labor out of agriculture to offset 
h d . . . 19 t ese pro uct1v1ty 1ncreases. 
A second type of benefit cited for agricultural development is the various 
stimuli resulting from increased demand for manufactured goods. These in-
creased demands from agriculture, providing an opportunity for other sectors 
d 1 h b d . d k "b . 20 to eve op, ave een es1gnate as mar et contr1 ut1ons. Market contribu-
tions are essentially of two types: The development of agriculture may 
17 Kuznets presents data for 1958 indicating that for 12 countries with 
gross domestic product less than $200 per capita, 46 percent of the product 
originated from agriculture and related industries while employing 57.6 
percent of the labor force [29, p. 402]. Myrdal presents similar data for 
various low income countries in Asia. For example, during the 1954-56 
period, 57 percent of the income in Pakistan originated from agriculture, 
while employing 71 percent of the labor force. The analogous figures for 
South Vietnam indicate that 82 percent of the labor force was employed in the 
agricultural sector but that this sector only contributed 34 percent of the 
income [41, p. 494]. 
18Mellor [39] exhibits great enthusiasm over the developmental prospects 
afforded by the green revolution. A more balanced viewpoint is presented by 
Wharton [64]. 
19The disparity between agricultural and nonagricultural incomes is not 
limited to today's less-developed countries. This disparity persists in 
modern developed nations and has existed during the earlier phases of their 
development. See Bellerby [2]. 
20 See, Kuznets [28, p. 63]. 
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increase the demand for off-fram purchases such as fertilizers and insecti-
cides. Increased demand for consumer goods by workers in the agricultural 
sector is expected to result from increased incomes. 21 
The process of economic development usually results in severe strains 
on the balance of payments. Primary exports are frequently the principal 
source of foreign exchange earnings in less-developed countries. In many 
cases, expansion of agricultural output can contribute significantly to easing 
of the balance of payments constraint through (a) expansion of exports if the 
country is in a food surplus situation or (b) through import subsitution if 
the country is in a food deficit situation.22 
The development of an investable agricultural surplus also contributes 
to general economic development through the factors which may be provided 
h . 1 1 23 to t e nonagr~cu tura sectors. Two types of factors generally are con-
sidered: First, an agricultural surplus provides capital or, more correctly, 
funds for the purchase of material capital goods by the nonagricultural 
sectors. In a free-enterprise system, this capital can be transferred through 
either taxation or in the form of private savings. Kuznets [28, p. 69] 
21The strength and importance of these stimuli to the industrial sectors 
will depend on, among other things, the size of the market created and the 
seriousness of the balance of payments situation. The establishment of one 
or more supply (or consumer goods) industries may also have second-round 
effects through various linkages stimulating the establishment of satellite 
industries. 
22 Industrialization in the absence of agricultural development will lead 
to increased strains on the balance of payments in the short run for at least 
two reasons. First, industrialization requires the import of vital capital 
goods, which must be financed through either capital inflows or exports. 
Second, as higher proportions of labor move to nonagricultural employment, 
increased food is required to feed the nonagricultural population and must 
be imported or deducted from the exportable surplus if the economy is a food 
exporter. 
23Nicholls [43] discusses the concept of an agricultural surplus and its 
potential contributions to development. 
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suggests that the burden of taxation on the agricultural sector frequently 
exceeds the extent of the services provided to the agricultural sector by 
government spending. The residual benefits accrue to nonagricultural sectors 
either in the form of social overhead capital or a subsidy to a particular 
. d . d . 24 1n ustry or 1n ustr1es. Private savings may be used to finance the purchase 
of essential capital goods in nonagricultural sectors, either through lending 
or direct investment. 25 
The second type of factor provided to the industrial sector is labor. 
The release of labor from food production is possible only when a marketable 
surplus of food is being produced. The transfer of labor implicitly involves 
a transfer of capital in the form of human capital since the agricultural 
sector has financed the rearing and training to maturity of migrating laborers. 
In earlier discussions of development, the provision of labor for industrial-
ization was considered to be one of the principal contributions of the 
26 
agricultural sector in the earlier phases of development. 
The emphasis now seems to be shifting to providing employment for the 
24 Mellor suggests that the central issue in agricultural developmental 
policy is "what level of taxes or other means of capital transfer can be 
placed on the agricultural sector and under what circumstances?" [40, p. 27]. 
Schultz thinks that Mellor goes too far in his taxation proposals [56]. 
25ewen [47] discusses another type of forced intersectoral transfer of 
agricultural surplus. This transfer arises from the asymmetric market 
structures existing in the farm sector (competitive) and the farm supply and 
processing sectors (monopolistic and monopsonistic). Owen argues that this 
market structure leads to an efficient means of intersectoral taxation since 
the farm supply and processing sectors manage to extract any profits arising 
from productivity increases in agriculture. These profits accrue to these 
farm supply and processing industries where they can be used for industrial 
capital accumulation. Owen also discusses the extraction of the agricultural 
surplus in the "Communist" model of development. 
26see for example, Lewis [33] and Johnston and Mellor [22]. 
27 
rapidly expanding labor force. 
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Economic historians have compiled considerable evidence on the "necessity" 
28 for increases in agricultural productivity to sustain economic growth. In 
this connection, Kuznets concludes that " ••• an agricultural revolution- a 
marked rise in productivity per worker in agriculture - is a precondition of 
the industrial revolution for any sizeable region in the world."29 Based on 
a review of the historical development of a number of nations, Nicholls reached 
a very similar conclusion when he stated that " •.• until underdeveloped coun-
tries succeed in achieving and sustaining (either through domestic production 
or imports) a reliable food surplus, they have not fulfilled the fundamental 
precondition for economic development" [44, pp. 366-367]. Eicher and Witt go 
so far as to state that, "Economic historians generally concur that there are 
no cases of successful development of a major country in which a rise in 
agricultural productivity did not precede or accompany industrial development" 
[10, p. 8]. 
Based on the preceding summary, it is apparent that the issue of indus-
trialization versus agricultural development has not been resolved. Agreement 
27compare the change in emphasis between Johnston and Mellor [22] and 
Johnston and Cownie [21]. See also the recent articles by Todaro [61] which 
suggest that the current interest seems to be more concerned with providing 
employment rather than releasing additional labor from agriculture. 
28In this connection, Gerschenkron [15a, p. 357] suggests, "There should 
be a fine on the use of words such as 'necessary' or 'necessity' in historical 
writings. As one takes a closer look at the concept of necessity as it is 
appended to prerequisites of industrial development, it becomes clear that, 
whenever the concept is not entirely destitute of meaning, it is likely to 
be purely definitional: industrialization is defined in terms of certain 
conditions, which, then •.• are metamorphosed into historical preconditions." 
29Kuznets [30, pp. 59-60]. In another statement, he suggests that, 
"One may conclude that a substantial rise in productivity of resources in the 
domestic agriculture sector is a condition of the large increase in overall 
productivity in modern economic growth" [29, p. 120]. 
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probably will never be unanimous regarding the "best" route to development. 
The general trend in the literature seems evolving toward the view that there 
are certain complementarities between agriculture and industry which should be 
exploited. Essentially, it is the purpose of this study to investigate the 
agriculture-industrialization issue. In the following section, several al-
ternative methods of investigation are discussed. 
ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF INVESTIGATION 
Three alternative approaches to the investigation of the industrializa-
tion-agricultural development issue are briefly discussed in this section. 
These are the interdisciplinary approach, the examination of economic history, 
and development theory. 
Interdisciplinary approach 
It has been widely acknowledged by economists that cultural, social, 
psychological, and political factors are extremely crucial elements in the 
development process. Unfortunately, these factors are too frequently simply 
dismissed as necessary "preconditions" for economic development or given a 
f .. 1 30 very super ~c~a treatment. Whyte and Williams suggest that a major obsta-
cle to conceptual integration of development research by economists and other 
social scientists is the difference in case size. "The economist generally 
focuses his analysis at the level of the nation, the economy as a whole, or 
some nationwide sector (the agricultural sector, for example). . ••. Sociolo-
gists, anthropologists, and psychologists occasionally give attention to the 
nation level, but their studies are more often concentrated on the behavior 
30see, for example, Tinbergen [60, pp. 3-4] and Rostow [51, p. 11]. Hoselitz 
[19, p. 53ff] suggests the preconditions that Western economists have in mind 
all too frequently are based on the type of socio-political organization that 
prevailed during the development of certain "Western success stories." 
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of particular individuals, groups, organizations, and communities."31 
The issue of industrialization and agricultural development has been 
discussed almost exclusively at highly aggregate or national levels. Most 
noneconomic discussions have involved the socio-economic implications of 
urbanization and transformation concomitant with industrialization. Very 
few noneconomic discussions of the industrialization-agricultural development 
issue have considered micro aspects of the problem in any detail. Perhaps 
the most important contributions from an interdisciplinary approach to prob-
lems of development are to be made in the area of microdynamics. Several 
issues need further elaboration. [Brewster (5)] cites sociological and 
psychological factors as barriers to change. Lewis (33, p. 159) discusses 
the need for the emergence of a new class of people. These issues seem 
important to a full understanding of the process involved in transforming an 
underdeveloped economy. 
Economic history and growth stage generalizations 
Recent interest in the economic history of development has been aroused 
by Rostow's concept of stages of economic growth. Ruttan differentiates stage 
theories into three classes, which he terms industrial fundamentalism, struc-
tural transformation, and leading sectors. 32 He concludes that, "All three 
stage theories ••. treat the transition from an agricultural to the industrial 
society as a major problem of development policy. Rostow's system is, how-
3~hyte and Williams [65]. This allegation regarding the case size for 
economists appears to overlook a number of microeconomic studies relating to 
peasant agriculture. See, for example, Sen [58] and Georgescu-Roegen [15J. 
It appears that the best prospects for theoretical integration are at the 
microeconomic level where the actions and attitudes of individuals can be 
studied. However, most of the studies relevant to the present investigation 
seem to be highly aggregated, nationwide studies. 
32 J See Ruttan [53, 54 • 
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ever, the only one which clearly specifies a role for the agricultural sector 
in the transition process" [53, p. 22]. 
In his evaluation of the contributions of the stage theories to develop-
ment policy, Ruttan reaches several conclusions pertinent to the present study. 
These are: 
"Clearly Rostow's leading sector model and the agricultural 
development approaches have helped focus attention on the 
critical role of the agricultural sector in the development 
process. Although agriculture may not contribute as a leading 
sector, over long periods, the historical record is consistent 
with the proposition that failure to achieve a technically 
progressive agriculture can dampen the whole process of economic 
growth ..• 
"The leading sector concept does add a potentially useful tool 
to our analytical capacity .•. 
"The basic limitation of the growth stage approach when employed 
as a guide to development policy is that it substitutes a search 
for economic doctrine in the form of historical generalizations 
from a limited historical sample should ... be based on observa-
tions drawn from the same 'population' ..• 
" ... emphasis on the 'take-off' and the differentiation of 
'stages' in both the general and agricultural stage approaches 
represents a 'blind alley' ... 
" ... a taxonomic scheme, utilizing growth stages as labels in its 
filing system, may represent a potential contribution to the 
analysis of economic development." [53, pp. 32-33] 
In particular, the lack of analytical power precludes the "historical" 
33 
approach in the present study. 
Dual-economy models 
The third approach, the one adopted in this study, is through the use 
33For criticisms of Rostow's version of growth stages, see the papers 
by Kuznets, Gerschenkron, Solow and others in Rostow [52]. 
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34 
of specialized, general equilibrium models known as dual-economy models. 
The term dual-economy arises from the act that economic activity in many less-
developed nations can be divided into two distinct types of sectors. Various 
names have been given to these sectors, such as the capitalist and the sub-
. 35 s~stence sectors, the advanced or modern sector and the backward or tradi-
tional sector, 36 and the industrial and agricultural sectors. 37 
The analysis of less-developed countries through the use of dual-economy 
models originates with the classic work of Lewis [33, 35] and has been ex-
tended by Jorgenson [23, 24, 25] and Fei and Ranis [12, 13, 14, 49]. 38 The 
34Ruttan [54] differentiates dualism into two types: static and dynamic. 
Static dualism, which includes sociological dualism and enclave dualism, re-
lates primarily to the cultural and technological characteristics prevailing 
in many less-developed countries. Ruttan suggests that these technological 
and cultural characteristics are the basis for many of the assumptions made 
in the dynamic dual-economy models. This section deals with the models Ruttan 
has classed as dynamic. 
35Lewis [33, p. 146]. The capitalist sector is defined as "that part of 
the economy which uses reproducible capital and pays capitalists for the use 
thereof ... The subsistence sector is by difference all that part of the econ-
omy which is not using reproducible capital" [33, p. 146-147]. By these de-
finations, the subsistence sector would include the majority of services. 
36Jorgenson [23, p. 311]. "The economic system may be divided into two 
sectors - the advanced or modern sector, which we will call, somewhat inac-
curately, the manufacturing sector, and the backward or traditional sector, 
which may suggestively be denoted agriculture." 
37Ranis and Fei use these terms as short-hand terminology for Lewis' 
capitalist and subsistence sectors but " ••• underscore the absence of any 
necessary one-to-one relationship between the subsistence sector and agricul-
ture, or between the capitalist sector and industry ... " [49, p. 534]. In 
their later work, they fail to mention this qualification [12, p. 4]. 
38Ruttan [54] considers the work by Lewis to be a bridge between static 
and dynamic dualism. The reason for this is unclear since Lewis' model is 
definitely dynamic, although not rigorously and explicitly specified as the 
models in the works of Jorgenson and Fei and Ranis, Also, there is some 
question about whether Fei and Ranis or Jorgenson contribute much besides 
rigor to the analysis of Lewis. With rigor, however, there are inevitably 
more stringent simplifying assumptions, some of which are rather difficult to 
accept. In the words of Lewis in commenting on the work of Fei and Ranis, 
"The mathematics seems impeccable; it is the assumptions that are odd •.. One 
must pay tribute to the geometrical ingenuity that makes it possible to bring 
- 18 -
models developed by these researchers are not reviewed in any detail. The 
relationship between these models and the models developed in this study is 
indicated later. 
Perhaps the most seri~us shortcoming of these models is the neglect of 
the intersectoral markets for factors. Only labor is considered in inter-
sectoral factor trade. In the light of the recent green revolution in agri-
culture with its high response to agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and 
chemical pesticides, neglecting intersectoral factor trade seems unrealistic. 39 
A second shortcoming common to these studies is the asymmetric treatment 
of the investment problem. All studies arrive at the conclusion that an 
40 
agricultural surplus is a necessary condition for sustained development, 
and all emphasize the contribution made by this surplus to capital accumula-
tion. Only Fei and Ranis, however, consider the desirability of investment 
in the agricultural sector. This consideration is not subjected to the same 
. 1 . . . h . d . 1 41 r1gorous ana ys1s as 1nvestment 1n t e 1n ustr1a sector. Given the supposed 
Footnote 38 continued from Page 17: so many variables into a stagnant equili-
brium. But of course, the value of a model is in direct proportion to its 
relationship to realiti' [32, pp. 159-161]. 
39 Kuznets [28] and others have indicated demand for manufactured inputs 
is one of agriculture's "contributions" to economic development. 
40Jorgenson [23, p. 324] and Lewis [33, p. 173]. Fei and Ranis actually 
argue that "balanced" growth between agriculture and industry is desirable 
[14, p. 190]. Nicholls [43] also demonstrates the importance of an agricultural 
surplus. All these demonstrations depend crucially on the assumption of a 
closed economy. Only Lewis and Nicholls, however, seem to recognize the 
limitation of their conclusion. 
41 Their discussions of investment in agriculture take on the appearance 
of an afterthought. For example, in the formal model presented on pages 28 
and 29 in [12] no allowance is made for investment in agriculture. Then they 
suggest that, ''The mutually beneficial relationship between the industrial and 
agricultural sectors of the dualistic economy is due to the fact that, from 
the viewpoint of the agricultural sector 'access to the agricultural sector' 
stimulates agricultural productivity and from the viewpoint of the industrial 
sector, 'access to the agricultural sector' increases the savings fund" 
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importance of the development of the agricultural sector, questions to be 
asked are: Should there be a net inflow of savings into the agricultural 
sector in the earlier (or later) stages of development? Under what conditions 
does investment in agriculture tend to be desirable? None of the persons 
dealing with dual-economy models has analyzed these questions, or even posed 
42 
them. 
The third common shortcoming of these dual-economy models is the neglect 
of the role of the government in the developmental process. It is now widely 
recognized that the government's role in less-developed countries is extremely 
important. Use of development planning to speed the process of development is 
fl f h . . 43 a re ection o t 1s 1mportance. 
THE MODELS: A HEURISTIC EXPOSITION 
The models developed in this study are more elaborate than most models 
to analyze the development of dualistic economies. Three distinct but closely 
related models are discussed. For convenience, these models are referred to 
as the decentralized model, the centralized model, and the food aid model. In 
this section a heuristic description of the models is provided. 
The decentralized model 
Intersectoral factor flows of labor, capital, and manufactured goods are 
examined in a five sector optimizing model involving three products, agricul-
Footnote 41 continued from Page 18: [12, p. 34]. A logical question is to 
enquire how productivity is "stimulated" in the absence of any real resource 
demands. 
42In a recent article, Dixit purports to demonstrate that, "Even a target 
of rapid industrial growth is shown to lead to balanced growth in the long run; 
and, if capital is very scarce at the beginning in agriculture, an initial phase 
of specialization of investment to agriculture is shown to be necessary [Sa, p. 203]. 
43For a list of countries which have formulated national plans, see 
Waterston [63, Appendix III]. 
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tural goods, manufactured goods, and capital goods. Agricultural goods, 
which are assumed to be produced in two sectors, a subsistence and a commercial 
sector, are used only for consumption purposes. The agricultural goods by 
these two sectors are perfect substitutes in consumption and consequently a 
common price prevails for the output from these two sectors. 
Capital goods are produced in a third sector of the model. Capital goods 
are used only as factors of production and are assumed infinitely durable. 44 
The fourth sector in the model produces the third product, manufactured goods, 
which may be used either for consumption or as nondurable factors of produc-
tion.45 Manufactured goods to be used either as factors of production or as 
consumer goods are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production. In other 
words, manufactured consumer goods and nondurable manufactured factors of 
production (manufactured inputs) are produced by the same firms using the 
"same" production processes. These firms are assumed to be indifferent be-
tween producing consumer goods or manufactured inputs, which leads to a common 
price for manufactured consumer goods and manufactured inputs. 
The fifth sector included in the model is the government sector. The 
government has at its disposal the instruments of government expenditure. 
Taxes are collected on all income. This tax revenue is used to invest in 
social overhead capital for agriculture or in capital accumulation in the 
manufacturing or capital goods sectors. The government is assumed to invest 
in these alternatives in a manner that tends to maximize social welfare over 
a finite horizon, where welfare is assumed to be a function of consumption 
44That is, depreciation is not included in the model. This simplifying 
assumption is not necessary to the analysis. There is no reason to suspect that 
any of the conclusions of this study would be appreciably altered by relaxing 
this assumption. 
45A nondurable factor of production is one completely used in production 
during the period of purchase. 
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only. 
The two agricultural sectors are differentiated by both technical and 
institutional considerations. Production in the subsistence sector requires 
inputs of land, labor, and nondurable factors of production purchased from the 
f . t 46 manu actur~ng sec or. The commercial agricultural sector uses durable capi-
tal goods as a factor of production in addition to the factors used by the 
subsistence producers. These durable capital goods are purchased from the 
47 
capital goods sector. 
At the institutional level, labor employed in the commercial agricultural 
sector receives a fixed wage rate. Employment is restricted so that the 
marginal value productivity of labor equals the wage rate. Labor employed in 
the subsistence sector, on the other hand, receives a residual income equal to 
the total value of subsistence production less the cost of the purchased man-
ufactured inputs. Thus, labor in the subsistence sector receives a portion of 
48 the income actually earned by the land. It is assumed that all income re-
ceived by labor is consumed (including land rent in the subsistence sector), 
and all income earned on the capital stock is saved. The savings are used to 
purchase capital goods from the capital goods sector. The rent on land in the 
commercial agricultural sector also is saved. 
For simplicity, the supply of labor is assumed to be perfectly inelastic 
46 For example, agricultural chemicals such as fertilizers and pesticides. 
47This does not include the substantial amounts of capital produced within 
the agricultural sectors, such as draft animals and livestock. These forms of 
capital are considered to be part of the "land" input. This assumption is 
valid only if these forms of capital are not increased during the period under 
consideration. These forms of capital may also be considered to be part of the 
land input in the subsistence sector. 
48E · 1 · th b . t d t qu~va ent to assum~ng e su s~s ence pro ucers are owner-opera ors. 
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throughout the period. 49 Labor employed by the government in the commercial 
agricultural sector, manufacturing sector, or the capital goods sector re-
. 1 f' d so ce1ves an exogenous y 1xe wage rate. This wage rate is assumed to be too 
high to allow all labor to be employed since (a) the three advanced sectors 
are assumed to behave competitively and (b) all factors must earn their mar-
ginal value productivity. Any labor which is not employed in the advanced 
sectors finds employment in the subsistence sector where an average produc-
tivity (of the sector) is earned. The subsistence wage rate is assumed to 
be lower than the wage rate in the advanced sectors, which, in effect, makes 
the supply of labor to the advanced sectors perfectly elastic in the initial 
phases of development (even though the entire labor supply is assumed perfectly 
. 1 . ) 51 1ne ast1c . 
The amount of land is fixed in total supply and it cannot be transferred 
from one sector to the other. (These two assumptions are necessary for 
technical reasons which are discussed later.) The former assumption may not 
be unrealistic. However, the latter assumption is very restrictive in the 
49The implications of relaxing this assumption are investigated in a 
later section. 
50various reasons for a rigid wage rate can be given. Perhaps the least 
objectionable and most plausible reason is that the laborers are organized in 
a union and restrict membership to maintain this wage rate. Other possible 
explanations include social legislation and unwillingness to work in other 
traditional employment at a lower wage rate. 
51As explained in the following sections, the marginal physical produc-
tivity of labor in the subsistence sector is never assumed to be zero. This 
seems to coincide with the evidence cited by Kao, Anschel and Eicher [26]. 
Thus, withdrawing labor from the subsistence sector tends to reduce production 
in this sector, and we are following Jorgenson [23] in this respect. However, 
a perfectly elastic labor supply curve to the advanced sectors coincides with 
the assumptions of Lewis [33] and Fei and Ranis [14]. Jorgenson [24, 25] 
made an interesting attempt to test the appropriateness of the assumptions of 
zero versus positive marginal physical productivity for labor. As Marglin 
[36] demonstrates, however, Jorgenson's test depends crucially on the assump-
tion of unitary elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the 
industrial sector. 
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context of the present model and effectively precludes the possibility of 
transferring land between the two sectors. 52 
Production in the manufacturing and capital goods sectors requires 
inputs of capital, labor, and manufactured factors of production. These 
sectors are assumed to be organized rationally, and all variable factors are 
employed to the point where their marginal value productivity equals their 
53 
cost. The income received by labor is consumed, and all rent on capital 
is saved. 
Time is considered in a discrete manner. The government collects taxes 
on all factor income. This tax revenue is used to accumulate labor intensive 
social overhead capital (SOC) in either of the two agricultural sectors. 
Alternatively, this revenue can be used to supplement the budgets of private 
savers who use the funds to purchase capital goods from the capital goods 
54 
sector. The government funds are allocated in a manner that maximizes the 
lf f h f . . h i 55 we are o t e country over a 1n1te or zon. This welfare is described by 
a quadratic function of consumption of agricultural goods (food) and manu-
factured goods (nonfood). This quadratic function approximates Engel's law 
in the sense that, as per capita consumption increases, the relative proportion 
of consumer income spent on food declines. 
Investment expenditures on SOC involves the hiring of labor from the 
52The opposite possibility of "decommercializing" the conunercial sector 
is also precluded. This, however, is of much lesser interest. 
53within every period, the capital stock within each of these sectors is 
considered a datum determined from the capital stock and investment in the 
preceding period. 
54Investment in either SOC or private capital does not have any pay-off 
until the subsequent period. 
55 In other words, the government draws up a development plan for the next 
(say) 15 years. 
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subsistence sector at the same wage rate earned in the advanced sectors. This 
labor is assumed to engage in extension or similar activities that increase 
the productivity of the specific agricultural sector to which it is directed. 56 
In other words, technical change in these two sectors is assumed to be a 
function of investment in soc. 57 
Two other alternatives for government expenditures are considered in the 
decentralized model. These are investment in private capital in either the 
capital-goods-sector or the manufacturing-goods-sector. Thus, in essence, 
the government has a choice of investing in any one of the four sectors. 
Private savings are assumed to be freely transferable among the three 
sectors. In other words, savings from the commercial agricultural sector can 
be used to accumulate capital in either the manufacturing or capital goods 
industries and vice versa. This is equivalent to assuming that there is only 
one savings fund. These savings are allocated among the three sectors in a 
manner that will equalize the expected marginal return in the subsequent 
period of the last unit spent. This allocation is made under the naive assump-
tion that all prices and factor allocations in the subsequent period will 
remain unchanged. In making their investment decisions, private investors 
take into consideration the government investment in private capital in the 
manufacturing or capital-goods sectors. (This condition is equivalent to the 
assumption that the government announces its investment plans before private 
investors make their decisions.) 
Relative prices are endogenously determined in this model. It is assumed 
that the welfare function reflects consumers' preferences with respect to the 
56A 1 · · · ld b h 1 b . n a ternat~ve ~nterpretat~on wou e to assume t e a or was engag~ng 
in labor intensive capital accumulation. 
57Technical change in the capital goods and manufacturing goods sector is 
assumed exogenous and productivity increases a constant percentage every year. 
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consumption of agricultural and manufactured commodities. With the welfare 
function viewed as an aggregate utility function, combining the utility 
function with the aggregate consumers' budget retraint (labor income) implies 
a pair of aggregate final demand equations for agricultural goods and manu-
factured goods. These aggregate, final demand equations, combined with the 
derived demands for capital goods (for investment) and manufactured goods 
(as factors of production), interact with the aggregate supply equations for 
each of these goods to determine the relative prices of the goods. (The 
price of manufactured goods is chosen as numeraire.) The aggregate supply 
equations are derived from the assumed aggregate production functions. 
Given the assumptions of a fixed supply of labor and the fixed wage rate 
in all sectors except the subsistence sector, employment in the subsistence 
sector is determined as a residual. The total labor supply is assumed to be 
large enough relative to the level of the fixed wage rate and other resources 
in the advanced sectors so that the resulting wage rate in the subsistence 
sector is below the wage rate in the advanced sectors. In other words, the 
labor supply is large enough so that, with the fixed wage rate in the advanced 
sectors, a major proportion of the labor is employed in the subsistence sector. 
Also, the ratio of labor to other resources in the subsistence sector is such 
that the marginal value productivity of labor in this sector is lower than in 
the other sectors. 
A diagrammatic representation of the expenditure and income flows in the 
decentralized model is presented in Figure 2 (p. 26). The five sectors are 
represented as rectangles. The ovals represent the two groups of income 
recipients, the capital owners and the laborers. Landowners are not included 
as a separate class of income recipients. The rent earned on land is simply 
attributed to the laborers in the subsistence sector and to the capitalists 
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in the commercial agricutural sector. The flows above the diagonal line AA' 
represent expenditures and those below the line represent income receipts. 
Expenditure flows are discussed first. 
The laborers spend all of their income on consumption goods. This con-
sumption expenditure is divided between agricultural goods (P 1c1) and manu-
factured goods (P2c2). The expenditures on agricultural goods are divided 
between the commercial and the subsistence agricultural sectors. Consumption 
expenditures by labor are the only source of revenue for the agricultural 
sectors. The manufacturing goods sector, on the other hand, sells its products 
to the two agricultural sectors (P2F1 + P2Fs) and the capital goods sector 
(P2F3) as well as to consumers. Hence, the manufacturing goods sector receives 
revenue from all four other sources. 
The capital goods sector sells its output (Y3 ) to either the capitalists 
or to the government. The capitalists spend all their income on private 
investment goods [P3 (r1+I2+I3)l. The government has two classes 
of expenditure alternatives. The tax revenue that the government collects 
may be spent on either SOC for the agricultural sectors in the form of wages 
net of taxes [w(l-J) (is+i1)] or on investment goods for the capital and 
- - 58 
manufacturing goods sectors [P3 CI2+I3)]. 
Turning now to the income flows, labor receives income from all five 
sectors. Employment in the commercial agricultural sector (L1), the manu-
facturing sector (L2 ) and the capital goods sector (L3) receives a fixed wage 
rate (W). Similarly, labor employed by the government for subsistence sector 
SOC (Ls) and commercial agricultural sector SOC (i1) receives the same wage 
rate. Labor employed in the subsistence (L ) sector receives a lower wage 
s 
58 Actually the government expenditure on SOC is both an expenditure and 
an income receipt since the entire expenditure net of taxes accrues directly 
to labor. 
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rate (W ). Capital owner~, on the other ha~d, do not r~ceive any pa~ent~ 
s 
from the government or subs:f,stence agricultural sectors since capital is not 
used in those two sectors. 
N 59 . h b . . 1 1 1 b et revenue Ln t e su s1stence agr1cu tura s~ctor accrues to a or. 
Part of this net reven4e is rent on the land, whi~h the laborers are presumed 
to own. The net revenue in the commercial agricultural sector is divided be-
tween the capitalists (who own the land in this sector) and the laborers. 
Since no primary factors are employed in the manufacturing and capital goods 
sectors, the net revenue in these sectors is divided between the laborers and 
capitalists as wages and rent on capital stocks. 
The centralized model 
The centralized model differs from thedecentralized model with respect to 
the role of the government and in the allocation of investment funds. The 
essential difference is that the government exercises complete control over 
the allocation of both the private savings budget and the tax revenue in the 
centralized model, Any rent accruing to capital i~ investecl in expansion of 
the capital stock in the co1runercial agricultural sector, capital goods sector, 
and manufacturing goods sector. Tax revenue can be used either to expand SOC 
in the agricultural sectors or to augment the private sayings budget. That is; 
taxes can either be used to hire labor for SOC projects, or the tax revenue 
can be used to purchase capital goods from the capital goods sectors. The 
same criterion is used in the allocation of both private savings and tax 
revenue. Specifically, this criterion is the maximization of welfare over the 
S gN · h · . . d f . d 1 1 h et revenue Ln t LS sectLon LS e Lne as tota revenue ess t e cost 
of purchased manufactured inputs apd taxes. 
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finite horizon being considered. 60 
This brief introduction to the decentralized and centralized models has 
been provided so that the reader has access to the principal aspects of the 
study without reading the more technical sections that follow. 61 The major 
conclusions are summarized in the following section which is followed by a 
separate analysis of food aid. 
THE DECENTRALIZED MODEL 
We now turn to a more technical analysis of agricultural development in 
relation to over-all economic development. Although the decentralized model 
is discussed first, the notation used also applies to the analysis in sections 
which follow immediately. The following notation is used: Variables are 
denoted by upper case Latin letters. Parameters are denoted by Greek letters. 
Lower case Latin letters and Arabic numerals are subscripts either on varia-
bles or parameters. All parameters, indexes, and variables are nonnegative 
unless otherwise indicated. Subscripts on variables include s = subsistence 
agricultural sector, 1 = commercial agricultural sector, 2 = manufacturing 
sector, 3 =capital goods sector, and t =time period (discrete). The 
variables are as follows: 
Y. production of good i, (i = s, 1, 2, 3). 
~t 
Fit use of manufactured goods (originating from sector 2) as a factor 
of production in sector 1, (1 = s, 1, 2, 3). 
60This reformulation of the model has the vir e of simplifying several 
very difficult technical aspects of the model, as well as relaxing one very 
restrictive assumption regarding investment. Specifically, the equations 
relating to investment in the decentralized model are so complicated that they 
are unmanageable unless investment is assumed to take place in every sector 
in every time period. It is this assumption that is relaxed in the central-
ized model. 
61 Some readers will prefer the more rigorous presentation in following 
sections. 
C. ~ consumption of good i, where i = 1 denotes agricultural goods and 1t 
i ~ 2 denotes manufactured goods. 
Kit = capital stock in sector i available for production during period 
t, (i 1, 2, 3). 
Lit= labor employed in sector i, (i = s, 1, 2, 3). 
Lit labor employed by the government in the accumulation of sociat 
overhead capital (SOC) in sector i, (i = s, 1). 
Pit price of good i, (i = 1, 2, 3) and Ps = P1 . 
Iit =private capital accumulation in sector i, (i = 1, 2, 3). 
Iit = public or government capital accumutation in sector i, (i = 2, 3). 
Git level of SOC in sector i, (i = s, 1). 
Eit government expenditure in sector i, (i = s, 1, 2, 3). 
B. ~amount of land in sector i, (i = s, 1). 
1 
Mt = tax receipts in period t. 
Zit = Lagrangean multiplier corresponding to the i~th constraint in 
period t. 
The parameters are: 
~l' ~2 • ~ll' ~ 12 , ~ 21 , and ~ 22 are parameters of the quadratic welfare 
function and will be discussed in detail below. 
a.= "intercepts" of the Cobb-Douglas form of production function sector 
1 
i, (i = s, 1, 2, 3). 
"elasticity of production" of SOC in the agricultural sectors. 
w = institutionally fixed wage rate in terms of man~factured goods. 
a. elasticity of production of factor j, sectors, (j = 1, 2, 4). 
J 
elasticity of production of factor j, sector 1, (j 1, 2, 3, 4). 
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yj =elasticity of production of factor j, sector 2, (j = 1, 2, 3). 
6. elasticity of production of factor j, sector 3, (j = 1, 2, 3), where 
J 
j = 1 refers to manufactured inputs, j = 2 refers to labor inputs, 
j = 3 refers to capital inputs, and j = 4 refers to land inputs. 
~ =terminal period of the plan (i.e., t = 0, 1, ••• , ~). 
e = exogenous rate of technological change in the manufacturing and 
capital sectors. 
w marginal (=average) tax rate). 
p = social discount rate on welfare. 
Some modifications and additional variables are introduced for the 
centralized model discussed later. 
The Welfare Function 
Welfare in any one period is considered a quadratic function of aggregate 
62 
consumption of manufactured and agricultural goods. The objective of the 
government is to maximize the welfare function over a finite horizon of ~ 
periods, with welfare in future periods discounted to the present at the con-
stant rate, or maximization of 
~ 
v = >: <~1c1t + 
t:l 
The welfare function is assumed to have the following characteristics. 
In any period t, the marginal welfare of increased consumption is positive; 
62since the labor force (and population) is assumed to be constant by 
nature of the product and income distribution assumptions, this is equivalent 
to maximizing a weighted average per capita consumption, where all subsistence 
employees consume at one rate and all advanced sector employees consume at 
another (higher) rate. The weights in the average are the proportions of the 
labor force employed in the subsistence and advanced sectors. 
and 
ov 
oc 
2t 
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> o. 
Without loss of ge~erality, consumption units can be chosen so that 
(2) 
(3) 
c10 = c20 = 1. The relative magnitudes of the various parameters of V are 
assumed such that ~l - 2~ 11 + ~ 12 > ~ 2 + ~ 12 - 2~22 . That is, in the initial 
period, amarginal increment in food consumption will contribute more to 
w~lfare than a similar increment in nonfood consumption. It is further as-
sumed that ~l > ~2 and 2~ 11 > 2~22 > ~ 12 > 0. This implies that 
tained from additional increments of food decreases at a more rapid rate than 
marginal welfare from additional units of nonfood consumption. The foregoing 
assumptions also imply that agricultural and manufactured goods are comple-
mentary in consumption and that the welfare function is negative definite. 
Every negative definite quadratic form has an unconstrained maximum, 
which is defined by the first-order conditions. In the case of (1), the 
values of the variables c1 and c2 at the optimum are given by setting (2) and 
(3) equal to zero and solving. The unconstrained maximum is given by the 
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system 
~ r-2~22 -f.l12Jr-f.l1J D -f.l -21 I -I I 12 ~11 -~2 (4) 
2 
where D = ~11~ 22 - ~ 12 > 0. It can readily be shown that c2 > c1 , given the 
assumption that ~ 1 /~ 2 < (2~ 11 - ~ 12 )/(2~ 22 - ~ 12 ) in addition to the assump-
. 1' d b 63 t~ons ~ste a ove. This implies that at the "saturation point" consumers 
prefer relatively more manufactured goods than at the initial income levels. 
lsowelfare lines corresponding to a quadratic form in which the para-
meters satisfy the foregoing assumptions would exhibit the general shape 
represented in Figure 3 (p. 34). The maximum occurs at the point denoted A. 
In the initial period, consumers would be consuming one unit of each good and 
the terms of trade (TT) implied by the isowelfare curve at that point would be 
d c 1 ~ 2 - 2~1 2 2 + f.l12 
dC2 = f.l1 - 21J.11 + f.l12 < 1. 
(5) 
Moving along the ray OR tends to move the TT against the agricultural sector 
. 2 2 2 2 s~nce 0 < o V/oClt < o V/oC2t. Hence, consumers with preferences represented 
by this welfare function are offered an equal proportionate increment of each 
good, and they will (in keeping with Engel's law) bid the price of agricultural 
63From (4)' we have DCl = 2~22~1 + ~12~2 and DC2 = ~12~1 + 2~11~2' 
Differencing and collecting terms we get (DC 1-nc2) = ~l (2~22 -~ 12 ) - ~ 2 (2~11 -~12) • 
Dividing by the positive quantity ~ 2 (2~ 22 -~ 12 ) we see that (DC 1 -DC2 )/~2(2~ 22 -~ 12 ) 
= ~1/~2- ( 2~11-~12)/(2~22-~12) < o. 
c 1 
1 
0 
- 34 -
dc 1 
-->-1 
dC 2 
Ts,)welfarc curvL'S cJnd implil'd terms ,1f tracll' 
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goods down relative to manufactured goods. 
The maximum point, A, or the quantities of c1 and c2 indicated by (4), is 
assumed unattainable within the finite horizon. In other words, it is assumed 
that the economy is at such a low level of productive capacity in the initial 
period that, within the T planning periods there will not be sufficient ex-
pansion in capacity. 
We now turn to the constraints on the system beginning with the sectoral 
production functions. 
The Production Functions 
The production process for each sector is a Cobb-Douglas form of production 
function. Output from the subsistence sector in period t is 
y 
s 1~ 
) ,., 1 "f 2 '"~. 
" 1 
= /-; G F I~ n 
s st_ st. st s (6) 
Land input, B , is fixed throughout the period. 64 Labor L , purchased inputs, 
s s 
F , and social overhead capital (SOC), G , are all variable. Purchased inputs 
s s 
include items such as fertilizers, insecticides, and similar materials from 
the industrial sector. Labor, measured in man-years, is "productively" 
employed in the sense that withdrawing labor, other inputs remaining constant, 
would reduce output. The SOC variable is explained in detail below. 
Production in the commercial agriculture differs from subsistence agri-
cuture since capital is used as a factor of production, or 
64since land is fixed throughout the period, notation may be simplified 
by defining a new intercept J 0 Ba4 . 
s s s 
v 
l 
lt 
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As in subsistence, land is fixed65 while other factors are variable. 
The following specific assumptions are used for production functions: 
tion to constant scale returns under (A) and (B), assumption (C) indicates 
(7) 
equal elasticities of production for manufactured inputs in the two sectors, 
and (D) indicates a lower production elasticity for labor in the subsistence 
66 
sector, together, the assumptions have a4 > s3 + s4' so that the production 
elasticity of land in the subsistence sector is greater than the combined 
67 
elasticity of capital and land in the commercial sector. Since land is not 
variable, diminishing marginal productivity of nonland resources, assumption 
(E) . 1 . . d . soc 6 8 preva~ s as even ~nvestment ~s rna e ~n . 
Production processes, in manufacturing and capital goods sectors differ 
from production in agricultural sectors since no primary or fixed factors are 
involved and technology improves at a constant exogenous rate of 100€ percent 
per year. The production function for manufacturing goods is 
65A - S4 
new intercept is defined as a 1 = a 1B1 . 
66Since labor is combined with capital in the commercial sector, a small 
change in labor input has a larger output response in sector 1 than a small 
change in labor input in sector s. 
6 7L d · . . 1 1 . d . h b . an ~s more ~ntens~ve y cu t~vate ~n t e su s~stence sector. 
68since a 4 > S4 , this applies to sector s as well as sector 1. If 
A > S4 or if A > a 4 , increasing returns would be permitted and lead to prob-
lems of noncon,rexity. For this reason, land resources are kept fixed. 
y 2t. 
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( 1 .L C' ) t_ C' y l LV2 K'¥ 1 
= r v J2 r. 2t 2t 2t ' 
and for capital goods is 
( l 
t. 6 6 6 1 2 3 
+€)r;r. L I< 
3 3t it 3t 
(8) 
(9) 
Production in the manufacturing and capital goods sectors thus is assumed to 
be a function of manufactured inputs, labor, and capital inputs. Both sectors 
use their own output in production. 
The next set of constraints discussed are those of factor availabilities. 
Before explaining these, we discuss the role of the government sector in the 
decentralized model. In the section below, the various types of government 
expenditure are explained. A continued discussion of the constraints follows 
on the next section. 
Government Expenditure and SOC 
In every period, the government collects taxes on all income at a con-
stant average and marginal rate,~. Tax receipts in every period, Mt' are 
. 1 . 69 proport~ona to ~ncome. Initially, government expenditures are assumed to 
equal tax receipts in each period, and no provision is made for foreign aid, 
deficit financing, or surplus budgets. The effect of foreign aid is analyzed 
with the centralized model in a later section. The government has four ex-
penditure alternatives (denoted Eit)' one relating to each sector. Thus, 
69Th . e assumpt~on 
necessary assumption. 
instrumental variable. 
of a constant marginal and average tax rate is not a 
The tax rate could actually be considered as an 
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Expenditure in the agricultural sectors is used to accumulate SOC, which 
is accomplished by hiring labor at a fixed wage rate, JJ • Thus, E. ""w L l.t it' 
(i = s, 1). This labor engages in various extension, general educational, and 
other activities that increase productivity in the agricultural sectors. 70 
Since labor employed in these activities is specific to either the 
comn1ercial or the subsistence agricultural sector, the government is confronted 
with a choice of investing in none, one, or both sectors. SOC in these sectors 
is defined in terms of "accumulated manhours." That is 
and 
(' 
H 
- r + 
. c: 1 
-: 
,.... 
+ '' 11 
t.-l 
T 'r.:; ·i ' 
t -l 
T 
i:l l i 
(10) 
(11) 
where Gil (i = s, 1) is an index of the level of SOC available to these 
sectors in the initial period. Equations (10) and (11) suggest that the level 
of SOC is cunulative. If investment in extension activities is made in period 
t, the payoff is not realized initially until t + 1, but is forthcoming in all 
subsequent periods. 
Two alternatives of a different nature are available. The government 
can invest in capital accumulation in either the manufacturing or the capital 
70An alternative interpretation is for this labor to engage in labor-
intensive capital accumulation such as a road or dam. Labor-intensive capital 
accumulation also is assumed by Lewis [33, p. 161] in his discussion of capital 
accumulation by means of monetary expansion. 
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goods sector. In the manufacturing goods sector, the government must purchase 
investment goods at the market price, P3t' and the amount spent on government 
investment in sector 2 is E2t = P3tiZt' These investment goods are combined 
with the capital stock available during period t in sector 2 and used in 
production in period t + 1. Government expenditure on capital accumulation in 
the capital goods sector is similar with E3 t = P3ti3t. 
These four alternatives provide the government an investment choice. In 
the two agricultural sectors, technological change is a function of government 
investment in SOC. This investment tends to offset diminishing marginal 
productivity from a fixed land input acting as an "additional factor." If 
agricultural output is expanded through public investment, the government must 
decide whether to invest in the commercial sector, the subsistence sector, or 
both. If the government is to have a legitimate choice, there must be alter-
native uses for funds that contibute to welfare. Government investment in 
manufacturing goods will have both direct and indirect effects on welfare: 
Output will be available for both consumption (direct effect) and for use as 
a factor of production in all sectors (indirect effect). Investment in the 
capital goods sector has its pay-off only in increased productive capacity of 
this section in the subsequent period. Since capital goods are not consumed, 
this increased capacity must be transferred to either the commercial agricul-
tural or the manufacturing sector before any pay-off in welfare is realized. 
Thus, if the government invests in capacity expansion in capital goods, pay-
off lags two periods. But, in all other sectors the lag is a single period. 
If the government chooses to invest in SOC, there is the added pay-off of job 
creation during the current period. 
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FACTOR AVAILABILITIES 
Land 
Land is assumed fixed for both agricultural sectors and there is no 
provision for its transfer between the subsistence and commercial sectors. 
The no-transfer provision effectively excludes the "commercializing" of the 
b . 71 su s1stence sector. 
Labor and wage rates 
Labor is mobile an1ong the sectors and total labor, L , is employed. Thus, 
0 
To-Lt+L +I. +T·u_+T2t_+L3t• s - lt st ( 12) 
Wage rates, rneasured in terms of manufactured consumer goods, indicated 
by w, are assumed to be sticky in a downward direction in all sectors except 
subsistence agriculture. In other words, labor receives a fixed wage, w, 
except in subsistence agriculture. Labor in the advanced sectors is paid its 
marginal value productivity. Labor unable to find a job in advanced sectors 
at this rate is employed in the subsistence sector. It is assumed that there 
are not enough jobs in the advanced sector to permit all labor to earn the 
wage rate w. Consequently there is "surplus labor" in the economy, and the 
marginal value productivity of labor in the subsistence sector is less than 
w (The supply of labor to the advanced sector thus is perfectly at a fixed 
wage rate.) This situation prevails until so much labor is withdrawn from the 
subsistence sector that the marginal productivity of labor in the subsistence 
71Th . . . . 1 d . d 1 t 1 . 1s very restr1ct1ve assumpt1on prec u es certa1n eve opmen a poss1-
bilities and is used to present problems of nonconvexity. 
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sector increases sufficiently to force up the real wage rate in the advanced 
72 
sectors. 
Manufactured Inputs 
The output of the manufacturing sector may be used either for consumption 
or as a factor of production in other sectors: 
y 
2t = ~ + F + ~ + R + c2t_" st lt · 2t · Jt_ 
Capital Stocks 
A given stock of capital initially is available in all three advanced 
(13) 
sectors. This initial capital stock (denoted K11 , K21 , and K31) may be aug-
mented in subsequent periods through investment, which involves the purchase 
of goods from the capital goods sector. Once capital is placed in a specific 
sector it is not transferrable to other sectors. Capital goods placed in the 
manufacturing goods sector is equally productive in all lines of production. 
Since depreciation is ignored, capital in period t is the sum of the 
initial capital stock and investments of all previous periods. Since the only 
source of investment funds in the commercial agricultural sector is from pri-
vate savings, the capital stock in period t is 
t.-1 
+ 
.,, I ~ li 
. 
i:l 
(14) 
Two sources of investment funds, public and private savings are available for 
72subsistence labor income is discussed in detail in a later section. 
Todaro [61] suggests that, in many less-developed countries, labor tends to 
1igrate to urban centers even though jobs are not available. 
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capital accumulation in the manufacturing and, capital goods sectors. For the 
manufacturing sector 
(15) 
and for the capital goods sector, 
(16) 
In a closed economy, investment goods must be purchased from the capital-goods 
sector, which has limited capacity. The capacity constraint is 
- -y~t = I + I + I + I2t + Ilt" 
"} J t 2t lt. (17) 
In addition, a limited supply of savings can be utilized to purchase these 
capital goods. 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND FLOWS 
In this section, prices and outputs are assumed to be fixed. 
Since the government collects taxes at a constant rate, o/, this is equi-
valent to taxing government employees and all output net of payments for 
~anufactured inputs. Thus, tax revenue is 
Ht = ~1 tPltyst (l - 'T]) + pltylt (l - :J1) + p2t.Y2t (l- Yl) 
(18) 
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In each of the private sectors, net income after taxes is completely 
distributed among the factors of production. Labor is assumed to consume all 
f f b . d . 1 . d 73 o its income a ter taxes, ut ~ncome earne on cap~ta ~s save . 
Subsistence sector 
The subsistence sector, like all the other private sectors, purchases 
nanufactured inputs at the market price. These factors are employed at a 
level such that MVP equals cost, or 
aP Y __ p F 
1 lt st. 2t st. (19) 
The re"1aining income in this sector is attributed to labor, which consumes 
all its income after paying taxes. Thus, net labor income in the subsistence 
sector is denoted as 
(1- ,:)(J (20) 
where a2 and a 4 indicate the constant shares of output earned by labor and 
land, respectively. Assuqing that the income earned by the land is consumed 
by the peasant operators is equivalent to assuming the peasants own the land 
they are farming and that these subsistence operators do not save. An 
alternative interpretation is that the landlord fails to collect any rent. 
73Th. . . h L . 1 L . 11 f ~s ~s a stronger assumpt~on t an ew~s emp oys. ew~s a ows or some 
leakage from income accruing to capital [33, p. 169]. Fei and Ranis, on the 
other hand, assume all income on capital is saved and that some additional 
savings are forthcoming from the agricultural sector where no capital is being 
used [12, pp. 29-34]. Jorgenson [23, p. 326l assumes that all wages are con-
sumed and that all income earned on capital is saved. Only Lewis considers 
public savings. As mentioned above, the constant marginal and average tax 
rate is not a necessary assumption. 
By assumption, we have 
L ' st 
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(21) 
and it is this assumption, along with the assumption of labor mobility, which 
results in a perfectly elastic labor supply to the advanced sectors. 
Commercial agriculture 
Production in sector 1 differs from that in sector s since capital is 
used in the former. This capital, as for all other factors, earns its mar-
ginal value productivity in every period. Labor is hired at the constant rate 
w and manufactured inputs are purchased with land in the commercial sector 
owned by the capitalists, 74 the income distribution relations respectively 
for manufactured goods, labor, and capitalists are 
·'.:\ 0 )' = p r~ 1 r ' l lt H. 2t 
:~2pli.:ylt -· 1 ' l ' anrl lt 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
where klt and blt denote the rate of return on capital and land respectively. 
Manufacturing and capital goods sector 
Income distribution in this sector is similar to that in the capital-
goods sector. Only the coefficients differ. Since manufactured goods are 
74The term capitalist is used as an abbreviation for "owner of capital 
stock." The term capitalist does not necessarily imply private ownership in 
the sense that individuals must own the capital. However, private ownership 
is perhaps the most meaningful interpretation for the decentralized model. 
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used as an input in their manufacture, the MPP equals one, or 
For labor 
v P Y = ;;;I 2 2t 2t -- -~2t, 
and the capital owners receive the income earned on capital 
= k_ I-\ Lt 2t 
where K2t represents the MVP of capital. 
For manufactured inputs and labor respectively in, the capital goods 
sector, 
and 
I,·J 
'-3 • t: 
The income accruing to capital owners is 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
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where K3t is the MVP of capital. 
Labor income and consumption restraints 
Under the assumption that all the income earned by labor is consumed on 
agricultural and manufactured goods, the only savings from this income source 
is via government as taxes collected from labor. Since capitalists save all 
their income, the aggregate consumers' budget restraint is 
(31) 
In addition, consumption in any period of the plan cannot fall below the level 
attained in the preplan period, as 
clt > 1 
(32) 
and 
c2 > l. (33) t 
d d d . 75 Finally, consumption of agricultural goo s cannot excee pro uct1on. 
clt_ = Y + Y 
st lt 
(34) 
The income earned by the capitalists is used to accumulate more capital. 
The allocation of these funds among alternatives is somewhat complicated and 
75A similar constraint applies to the consumption of manufactured goods 
and is given as [2.13]. 
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and is discussed in the following section. 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
Investment behavior has been a topic of controversy in economics. In-
vestigation of this controversy is not the purpose of this study. Hence, 
some simplifying assumptions are used to specify investment decisions of the 
capitalists. Capitalists receive a return from their capital stock in each 
period. This rent is used to accumulate more capital by purchase of invest-
ment goods from the capital goods industry. Their overall budget constraint 
thus is 
(35) 
which requires the value of private savings to equal the value of private 
investment. 
We assume that capitalists allocate investment among the three sectors 
to maximize the expected return from their capital stocks in period t + 1 and 
that they expect all prices and factor allocations in subsequent periods to 
remain unchanged. These private investors, however, take full account of 
government investment in either SOC in the agricultural sectors or in "private" 
capital in the manufacturing or capital goods sectors. In addition, investors 
take into account exogenous technical changes in manufacturing and capital 
goods sectors. 
Symbolically, they attempt to maximize expected or anticipated revenue 
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"1 v2 - v F2t 1~t(K2t + 12t + 12t) l 
(KJt + i3t + I3t)53, (36) 
where T = t + 1. This must be maximized subject to the budget constraint (35) 
without disinvestment. Formulating this as a constrained maximum through 
introduction of a Lagrangean multiplier, Z, and applying the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions [27l, the following first order conditions result: 
"" 1\ ( 1, lt-. \ 'lt + 
r 0? = ()• T > 0; 
'lt bTlt. I Jt (37) 
< 0; 
r 2t 
0~ 0; l2t. > 0; "" (, 12t 
(38) 
= 0; (39) 
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where 
\ l] c~ ') 
1\lt. q ( '~ r-~ }P r~ " ··r ... (40) = + .') -· J , 3 1 4 . lt. lt 1 lt Jt 
2 T "] v2 
!\ = v p ( 1 + €) 0 ;::;-- . L2 t ' (41) 2t. .1 2t 2 2t - . 
and 
All: = ) 2p ( l 3 lt + 
'I' 17 51 ')2 
t;) Ci3• 3t L·3t (42) 
Conditions (37)-(39) and the budget constraint (35) specify values of 
Ilt' IZt' and I 3 t that maximize expected revenue for the capitalists. Under 
the additional, highly restrictive assumption that Ilt' ItZ' and I 3t are 
positive in all periods, these first order conditions simplify to: 
(43) 
and 
- v -1 
= l\ ( I~ 2 + 1 + I ) l 2t t 2t 2t (44) 
Equations (43) and (44), along with the budget constraint (35) define optimum 
levels of investment in the three sectors. 
It is useful to digress and explain the implications of the assumption 
that I. is positive in all sectors. Under equations (43) and (44), capital-
l.t 
ists allocate investment so that the value of expected marginal revenue is 
equal in all three sectors. In each period, capitalists must have sufficient 
investment funds to attain an equilibrium. Under the less restrictive in-
vestment criteria of (37)-(39), capitalists invest in the most profitable 
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industry until either the investment funds are used up or their share of 
expected marginal value of each expanded investment falls to the level of the 
second most rewarding opportunity. Then, simultaneous investment is made in 
the two most profitable industries until all the investment funds are used up 
or until returns on capital in the two most profitable lines fall to the return 
level expected in the third industry. Simultaneous investment then is made in 
all three industries to the limit of investment funds. Sufficient funds must 
be available to attain this state of intersector-returns equality if the econ-
76 
omy is to afford the "luxury" of balanced growth. 
WAGE, PRICE, AND OUTPUT DETERMINATION 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the operation of the model 
aside from the influence of the government. Capital stocks in each period, 
K = (K1 , K2 , K3), are taken as data. The question now is how consumers, 
capitalists, laborers, and entrepreneurs interact within each period to deter-
mine wages, prices, and outputs. A simplified model demonstrates that there 
are two "degrees of freedom" in the absence of government. These "degrees of 
freedom" subsequently are used to choose a numeraire for prices and define the 
exogenous wage rate. 
Consider the following simplified model where the number before the "a11 
on the equation number indicates the basic equation for derivation. Time 
subscripts are omitted since only one period is considered. In each period 
consumers (laborers) attempt to maximize aggregate welfare 
w (la) 
76For a critique of the balanced-growth thesis and reasons that this can-
not be attained, see Hirschman [18, Ch. 4]. Hirschman argues that unbalanced 
growth may be desirable. 
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subject to their budget (income) restraint 
J(P,Y), (31a) 
where p and Y are sectors representing (P 1, P2 , P3) and (Ys, Y1, Y2 , Y3) 
respectively. Consumer theory indicates that this maximization leads to a 
system of demand equations that are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and 
incomes. Since nominal consumer income in this model (31) is homogeneous of 
d .. 77 h 1' d d . 1 h egree zero ~n pr~ces, t e resu t~ng eman equat1ons a so are omogeneous 
of degree zero in prices. Consequently, the demand equations are sufficient 
to determine only relative prices. The two demand equations are denoted as 
(45) 
and 
2 C (P,Y). (46) 
Next, consider production in the commercial agricultural sector. The 
production function, 
(7a) 
d h f d d . . 77 an t e irst-or er con ~t~ons, 
(22a) 
77The subscripts on the functions denote partial derivatives. 
and 
P Hl = W 
111 
imply a short run supply equation 
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Similarly for the manufacturing sector, from 
and 
= w 
we get the supply equation 
The analogous equations relating to the capital goods sector, 
(23a) 
(47) 
(Sa) 
(2Sa) 
(26a) 
(48) 
(9a) 
(28a) 
and 
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and 
w (29a) 
imply the supply equation 
Y3 (P P w K ) 2' 3' • 3 . (49) 
Since employment in the subsistence sector is a residual there is no 
derived demand for labor for this sector. Consequently, the supply equation 
for the subsistence sector is of a somewhat different nature. From (22G) and 
(23a) for sector 1, we get an equation indicating the derived demand for labor 
in sector 1. This is denoted as 
1 
J1 -- L (Dl' pI' 
L. 
, K ) • 
1 (50) 
Similarly, for sectors 2 and 3 we get derived labor-demand equations denoted as 
L2 = I:Z(P (1 ' K ) (51) . 2 , 2 
3 
T : L ( P , Pl, , K ) (52) 
' 
2 1 • 
Substituting (50)-(52) into (12a), we get employment in the subsistence sector 
as 
L 
s 
L 
0 
- Ll - L 2 - L3 = Ls (P :oJ K L ) 
' ' ' ' . 0 
(53) 
From (53), the production function 
y 
s 
s H (F , 1 ) , 
s s 
and the first order condition 
p~ 
rr's 
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we get the supply equation for the subsistence sector, 
s Y (P, w, K, 1 ) . 
0 
(6a) 
(19a) 
(54) 
From the first order conditions (19a), (22a), (23a), (25a), (26a), (28a), 
and (29a), we obtain derived demand equations for manufactured inputs 
s 
C' 
-- F ( p, I'-' J K, Lo), (55) 
s 
F = ::;•1 ( p p2' I 'J ' l\ l ) , (56) 1 . 1 ' 
2 
[;' 
-· 
[;' ( p2' l; \ , I\2 ) ' (57) 2 
and 
p 
= r.'l(P2, p . '.• ' K i ) • (58) l ·~ 
Similarly, the derived demand equations for investment goods can be derived 
from the first order conditions (43) and (44) and the capitalists' budget 
constraint (35a). These investment demand equations are 
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I = I 1 (P, 'I I; , K), (59) 1 
12 --
2. 1 ( p, •' , !\), (60) 
and 
T 
= J 3 (P, f 1'\ ) • (61) -".3 
By making the appropriate subsitutions, the following me1rket equilibrium 
equations are obtained 
, I\ l ) _._ y s ( p , 
for agricultural goods , 
v? (" K- ) = ~='s ( P' 
- .~ 2 , ~ f 2 , I-; ' 
1 2 
1 0 ~ + , .. ( pl. ' p f i· I E ) + F ( p? , 0 ' K 2 ) 2 1 -
l 
-1- r;' ( 'D 
' 2 , P~, 
for manufactured goods, 
for investment goods, and 
I 
, Ki) + C"'(P, , K' L ) , 
0 
(13a) 
2 l 
', K) +I (P, ,,, K) + l (P, L•), K), (17a) 
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+ L 3 ( P , P , c: , K ) 
2 3 3 (lZa) 
for labor. 
Four equations now determine four variables, P1 , P2 , P3 , and W, However, 
in order to determine Ls in (53), the values for L1 , L2 , and L3 were substi-
tuted into (12a). Thus, (12a) cannot be used as an equilibrium condition to 
determine a wage rate. In effect, a fifth variable, L , remains to be 
s 
determined if (12a) is used as an equilibrium condition. This leaves three 
equations and four unknowns. By choosing a numeraire and identifying an 
exogenous wage rate, the system becomes determinate. Thus, two equati.ons are 
added: 
1' (62) 
and 
(63) 
In other words, manufactured output is chosen as the numeraire, and labor is 
paid an exogenously determined, constant amount, w, of manufactured goods per 
period. (These manufactured goods can, of course, be bartered or traded for 
agricultural goods). 
A digression on supply response in agriculture 
M h h b . b 1 . b . . 1 78 uc as een wr1tten a out supp y response 1n su s1stence agr1cu ture. 
78 See, for example, the literature cited by Bhagwati and Chakravarty [41. 
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This section demonstrates that, in the decentralized model, subsistence 
output might respond inversely to a price increase. This inverse response, 
however, can be more than offset by the increase of the commercial agricultural 
sector. 
A simple means of specifying supply response is to make the appropriate 
b . . . h . 79 su st~tut~ons ~nto t e two equa.t~ons. 
(;y (\ L' hT 
s Hs s 'Ts 
c• 
.::> 
(\pl "" i)p·-· + (·'D (64) F' Ls s 1 ] 
and 
r~ Y OF i! L 
1 Hl 1 Hl 
"" () pl + l})pl . (65) r) P 1 F L l 
From (6) we obtain 
:l" "' v 
"" 
1 s 
!;' ~ , (66) s 
and 
ry y 
TI8 
"" 
2 s. (67) 
'L 
s L 
s 
From (19) we get 
(68) 
79 oKl __ 
· In the derivation of (65) it has been assumed that 0. That is, 
this section deals with short-run supply responses. oPl 
and (53) together with (23) yields 
where 
ilL 
s 
i! p 
.1 
* \. 
'1s = r;sus, * 
A. 81 
0'1 = Glu1Kl ' 
Substituting into (64) yields 
= 
al 
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(69) 
1 
= ------- and b-, = 
_1 ____ 
1 ... 1 132. - "1.1' -
(70) 
This will be negative if the absolute value of the second term on the right 
exceeds the magnitude of the first. In other words, output from the subsis-
tence sector will decline as the product price increases if the effect on 
production resulting from the exodus of labor from the subsistence sector 
~ecause of the more lucrative jobs being created in the commercial sector) 
more than offsets the production increase resulting from the increased use of 
manufactured inputs. This possibility does not exist for total supply, however, 
as is clearly evident by adding (70) to the analogous equation for the com-
mercial sector. This result is 
(71) 
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The first and second terms to the right of the equal sign are clearly positive. 
Recalling the assumption implied in (21), the last term is also positive. The 
marginal productivity of labor in the subsistence sector is lower than in the 
commercial sector. 
Finite Planning Horizons and Post-plan Considerations 
When only a finite horizon is considered for inter-temporal development 
planning, several interrelated problems arise. 80 T~o of them involve the length of 
the planning period and the allowances made during the plan for periods after 
the planning period. 
The choice of the planning horizon is crucial in an optimizing model. A 
plan that is optimal for T periods may not be optimal for T + 1 periods. An 
ideal model would be one in which the optimal plan for the first periods is 
invariant, regardless of the horizon being considered. One theoretical solu-
tion to this problem is a horizon with an infinite future. Uncertainty re-
garding the future, lack of relevant data, and computational difficulties, 
however, invariably result in finite horizons in empirical applications. 81 
Truncating the horizon at T periods, poses the question as to what 
happens in periods immediately following termination of the plan. Post-plan 
activities and possibilities are conditioned by the productive capacity 
bequeathed to the post-plan era. If no special provision is made to provide 
some incentive to invest or accumulate productive capacity in the latter 
stages of the plan, decision makers would emphasize current consumption rather 
than accumulate capital. One possible soultion is to require a specified 
capital stock in period T + 1. Another possibility is to provide an additional 
8°For a discussion of some of these problems see Chakravarty and Eckaus 
[7l. 
81For a discussion of some of the difficulties involved with considering 
infinite planning horizons, see Chakravarty [6]. 
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incentive at the end of the plan by attaching a special value to any capital 
bequeathed to posterity. 
In the present model, the incentives to the private investors in period 
t are a function of prices, returns to capital, and government investments in 
period t. The same considerations apply in period T. The investors are as-
sumed to behave in the same manner in the last period of the plan as in any 
other period since they are not "aware" that period T is the last period of 
the plan. However, the rules specifying government expenditures provide no 
incentive to invest in private capital accumulation or SOC in the final period 
since this investment does not contribute directly to welfare in period T, 
The only payoff realized in the plan period is through any additional employ-
ment in the placement of SOC. However, the government collects tax revenue 
which must be spent. The rule imposed on government expenditures in period 
T is that expenditures in the final period must be allocated in the same 
proportions as in period T - 1. Defining T = T - 1, these rules may be 
specified as 
M L := MT f, 'T' (72) 
'I.' ST s 
"-' I 
'!' '1 r := ~1r Ll 'T' (73) 
~-1 p 1 := M p_ I (74) T 31 21 r 1T 2r 
and 
-
l'vf p 
T 3T I -- MrPJ'f J -1T (75) 3T 
This completes the formal presentation of the model. The model is op-
timized in the following section. 
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OPTIMIZATION OF THE DECENTRALIZED MODEL 
Solution of the optimizing problem for the decentralized, dual-economy 
model is through maximizing the differentiable, concave function (1) subject 
to a number of differentiable convex constraints. All variables must be non-
negative. Application of the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions [27], involves 
formulating a Lagrangean function in the next section. The first-order con-
ditions for the decentralized model are presented in the next section. 
The Lagrangean Function 
The Lagrangean multipliers are denoted as Zit' where the subscript i 
corresponds to the number of equations presented earlier. The subscript t 
refers to the time period. The constraints in the function are formulated to 
require the associated dual variables (Lagrangean multipliers) to be positive, 
(with the possible exceptions of z43t' z44t' z72' z73' z74' and z75' which 
can be either positive or negative). Letting T = ~ - 1, the following 
Lagrangean function results: 
'1 " (, I r - l: ,., - . . ,.., 2 LJ ,., ~ ' I ,...2 ) ( 1 -1- P ) -t 
== ",_..1-lt- +- - 2'-2t f-'-11' H +. 12' lt'--2t - '22--~t 
t v V2 .'! J \" ,--, ( ( 1 L· ) R l T I· v ) 
-1- /'<_> r; -1-'-' '2--_ 7t- '2t - '2t·_ \)t - 2 t -- -- -
+ > 
y ) 
lt 
- 62 -
-
+ >-:: '7, 2 (I. -L -Llt_ -Lst -T 1 t. -J,2t -T ~t) 1 t o st J 
7: <cu-1) + -;;_: 
32t 
- 63 -
+ :s 
r - Yrl (F , \~3-1 } 
+ ;:: '7, tA2t(K + 1 2t:o~-I2t) -Alt 1f'-Ilt 1 44t 2t_ - -
+ ~ '7, (T- M - -L M ) ;, '72 , T ST'"•r sT 
- -
+ ?: -::~73 ( Ll'rl'1r - LlTM'T') 
-
+ ;:: '7,74(P3Tj2'T'MT - p3T 12TM'T') 
(76) 
In subsequent sections (10), (11), (14), (16), (18), and (40)-(42) are 
treated as though they have been eliminated by substitution. However, the 
symbols defined by these questions are used whenever this simplifies notation. 
In addition, (62) and (63) are completely eliminated by substitution. All the 
summations in (76) refer to the subscript t and run over the range t = 1, 
• • • ' T. 
The First-Order Conditions 
The first-order conditions for an optimum resulting from the application 
of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to the Lagrangean function (76) are now presented. 
Under the Cobb-Douglas production functions used, assuming that production is 
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positive in all sectors implies that factor inputs in every period are posi-
tive. The simplifying assumption was made previously that I. > 0 for all i 
~t 
and t. Constraints (32) and (33) require c1t and c2t to be positive, and it 
is reasonable to assume Plt and P3 t to be positive. This leaves only the 
four government expenditure variables to be subjected to the corner conditions. 
More specifically, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are applied to the four vari-
ables Lst' Llt' i 2t, and i 3t. 
The first order conditions for an optimum are as follows: 82 
:::: 0 (77) 
(78) 
v 
+ 7 14 = 0 ( t. = 1, • • • , T -2 ) (79) 
(80) 
(81) 
82subscripts on V denote partial derivatives (e.g., VX = ~ ). For sim-
plicity, time subscripts are omitted whenever this will 
not cause any confusion. In all cases, the same first-order conditions apply 
,to every time period (t = 1, •.• T) unless otherwise specified. 
VF = 
s 
VF = 1 
v = 
F2 
Vp3 = 
v = 
Ls 
VL = 1 
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Z6rt1YS/Fs 
-
2 13 + z19 = o (83) 
Z781Y1/F1 
83-1 
- z13+Z22-z4481A1(K1+11) /F1 = 0 (84) 
- '( -1 0 (85) Z8y1Y2/F2-z13+Z25+(Z43+Z44)y1A2(K2+12+12) 3 /F2 = 
Zgo 1Y3/F3 
- 0 1 
= 0 (86) 
- Z[3Z28 - z43o1A3(K3+13+13) 3- /F3 
Z6rt2Ys/Ls - z12 = o ( 8 7) 
Z782Y1/L1 -z12 -z23 w -
83-1 
z4482A1(K1+11) /L1 = 0 (88) 
(90) 
(91) 
(t:1, •.• , T-2) (92) 
,. 
= 83 . ~ <z7iy1i/K1i) - 217t - 23stP3t l=t+1 
= 0 (93) 
V-
L]t 
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,. 
i=£+ 1 (ZgiY2i/K2i) - 7 17t-zl5tp3t 
T 
- Y3-2 ('74.., .+7.44. )A2. (K2 .+I +I2.) 
>1 1 1 1 2i 1 
T 
>.: (7. 9 .Y /K..,.) -7. -z P i:t+1 1 3i ~1 17t 35t 3t 
-
Lst"f = 0; 
· 'st 
E t > o ( t = 1, •.• , r -2 ) s. 
1 
= 0 
= \. (~ v /G .) - Z ~ ~(1-ili)(? - 7 ) 7i 1i 11 12t r 'f LJ:n .Jl8 
,. 
- \ :;:; 
t:l 
L V- = 0; 
1t L t s 
,. 
Llt > 0 (t=l, ••• , 1-2) 
Vi = vl :;:; (7.9.Y /K ) -7 - z p 
2t - i=t+J ( 1 2 i 2 i 1 7t 18t 3t 
,. 
+(y3-l) i~t (7:4.3i+~44i)l\2i\Kzi+I2i+ 1 2i)Yl-2 < O; 
I2tV-I = 0,• -I > () (t 1 T 2) ••2t ;... ·= ' ••• , -
. 2t . 
,. 
;: ( zg . Y.., ./I\ . ) -7. -z P _ 
' t 1 1 Jl ll l7t J8t 3t 
.1= -+-
T - ~ -2 
' 7. . A3 .· ( K 3 · + 1 i . + I ~ . ) · 3 < 0 ; i:t 4 3 1 •. 1 .. 1 ] j l 
I V- = 0; 3t r 3 t 
( t:] , 
... ' T -2) 
In addition, certain special first-order conditions are required to 
determine the values of some of the variables in the last two periods of the 
(94) 
(95) 
(96) 
(97) 
(98) 
(99) 
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plan. These special conditions, resulting from the restrictions placed on 
the allocation of government investment during periods T - 1 and T, can be 
derived directly by differentiating (1) with respect to the appropriate 
variables for periods T - 1 and T, and applying the Kuhn and Tucker rules. 
Since these conditions are not crucial to the subsequent discussion they are 
not presented. 
The first-order conditions in (77)-(99) and the special conditions re-
lating to the last two periods of the plan must be combined with the equations 
of the model to determine values for the variables that will optimize (1). 
The relevant equations are (6)-(9), (12), (13), (17)-(19), (22), (23), (25), 
(26), (28), (29), (31)-(35), (43), (44), and (72)-(75). Failure to consider 
all first-order conditions relating to the last two periods of the plan 
l 
results in a certain amount of indeterminacy in the earlier periods of the 
plan as well. The subsequent discussion is not affected by this indeterminacy. 
In the next section, factors influencing the feasibility and desirability 
of investing in SOC in the subsistence sector in one period are discussed. 
The subsequent section discusses the remaining investment alternatives avail-
able to the government. These alternatives are compared with private invest-
ment opportunities. 
SOC Investment in the Subsistence Sector 
The government has tax revenue to allocate among the four alternatives 
Lst' Llt' i 2t' and i 3t in each period. The optimum levels of these variables 
must satisfy conditions (96)-(99) in each of the first T~2 periods. Thus, 
the government should invest in SOC in the subsistence sector in period t 
only if v1 
st 
0 in (96). This implies that 
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T 
\ r, 
i=t+l 
(?: y .jr,. ,) + '7, w(l-W) -- 7,J2t. + 718tt''(l-\) 6i Sl Sl llt ~ ~ (100) 
Where the terms on the left are social pay-offs and those on the right are 
social opportunity costs. An interpretation of (100) is that, if Lst is to be 
greater than zero, the sun1 of the discounted marginal social value productivity 
in all subsequent plan periods of labor used in subsistence SOC accumulation 
in period t plus the social value of income paid to labor on the SOC project 
must be large enough to offset the social opportunity cost of the labor em-
ployed on the project plus the social opportunity cost of the government 
d . 83 expen ~ture. Thus the problem is to identify those particular characteris-
tics of an economy that will contribute to fulfilling this requirement. From 
(100) a number of factors can be identified. 
We first discuss the coefficient, A· Ceteris paribus, the larger the 
magnitude of A the more productive SOC will be at all levels G and conse-
st 
quently, the higher the optimum G /Y ratio will be for any given set of 
st st 
social valuations of costs and pay-offs. Schultz suggests one of the crucial 
elements making the subsistence sector responsive to investments in SOC is 
the level of education of the people involved l57l. Many other social and 
physical characteristics of the people and the type and nature of the agricul-
83The condition which must be satisfied to make it socially desirable to 
invest in subsistence SOC in period t depends on the amount that will be in-
vested in subsistence SOC in period T - 1. It is this type of intertemporal 
or dynamic link that results in the indeterminacy in the earlier periods from 
not specifying all the first-order conditions for the last two periods of the 
plan. Thus, a certain amount of intertemporal substitution is possible. The 
higher the level of L , t - 1, the relatively less desirable it will be to in-
vest in subsistence s~ctor SOC in period t < T - 1. Similarly, the larger 
L t' the relatively less desirable it will be to invest in subsistence SOC in 
p~riod T - 1. 
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ture involved also have important influences on this coefficient. For example, 
the magnitude of A will depend on the type of infrastructure being developed 
(e.g., irrigation systems, extension activities, etc.). 
A higher A coefficient will make investment in SOC physically more 
productive and, ceteris paribus, more socially profitable. Similarly, the 
higher the social valuation of subsistence agricultural production (Z6t) in 
subsequent periods, the higher the likelihood that the benefits accruing to 
investment in SOC in period t will offset the costs involved. The value of 
this variable, z6t, may be expected to vary inversely with the ratio of c1t/ 
c2 t. In other words, as the ratio of agricultural production to manufacturing 
"surplus" increases, the social valuation of agricultural production might be 
expected to fall. Hence, the higher the ratio c1/c2 , the relatively less 
desirable investment in G becomes. 
st 
The marginal social value of a unit of labor (consumer) income in period 
t is given by z31 t. This variable varies directly with the proportion of the 
population employed in subsistence agriculture. That is, z31 t increases with 
the proportion of the entire labor force employed in the subsistence sector 
(L t/L ). For a given set of prices, per capita real income to labor declines 
s 0 
as the ratio 1 /1 increases. Ceteris paribus, the marginal social value of 
st o 
an additional unit of consumer income (z31 t) will increase as income decreases. 
Thus, the higher the proportion of labor in subsistence agriculture, the 
relatively more desirable it becomes to invest in G • 
st 
With the right-hand side of (25), the marginal social opportunity cost of 
an additional unit of labor (z12 t) is expected to decline as the size of the 
labor force (10) increases. The value of z12 is determined largely by the 
social value productivity of labor in subsistence agriculture, and this value 
declines as 10 and 1s increase. 
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The last term on the right-hand side of the equation indicates the social 
opportunity cost of using government tax revenue to accumulate SOC. The mag-
nitude of this term is related to the amount of tax revenue available and the 
other alternatives open to the government. In summary, for an economy with a 
given configuration of wages, prices, capital stocks, SOC, primary resource 
base, and technology, the social desirability of investing in SOC in the sub-
sistence sector will increase as the size of the labor force (L ) increases 
0 
since, for a given wage-price-capital stock configuration, Lst/L0 increases 
with L (L is a residual that varies directly with L ). Also, L increases 
o st o st 
with Y and the 11 optimum" level of G is augmented. An expanded labor 
st st 
supply influences the social desirability of subsistence SOC expansion through 
the increasing ratio L /L , the increased social pay-off to employment crea-
st o 
tion (z31), and the reduced social opportunity cost of labor. 
Alternative Investment Opportunities 
The social opportunity cost of using government tax revenue to accumulate 
SOC in the subsistence sector depends on the amount of tax revenue available, 
as well as the social desirability of investment alternatives. The alterna-
- -
tives available to the government in any period are expenditures on Llt' IZt' 
and i 3t. If any of these alternatives are to be utilized in a particular 
period, the corresponding first derivative of (76) must be equal to zero in 
the first-order conditions (97)-(99). For example, if i 3t > 0, then v:i3t 0 
in (99). Suppose that v13t = 0. Substracting v13 t from (95), we get the 
result that 
= z p - 7, p = 0 35t 3t 18t 3t. (101) 
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and since P3 t is positive by assumption, 
(102a) 
This suggests that, if it is socially desirable for the government to invest 
in i 3t, thenthe socialopportunity cost of using government tax revenue (z18t) 
for this purpose must be equal to the social opportunity cost of using private 
invest1nent funds (z35 t). Furthermore, if (102a) holds, then it follows immed-
iately from (94) and (99) that 
v 
I2t 
v-
I2t 0. (103) 
In other words, if it is socially desirable for government to invest in I 3t 
at the margin, it also is desirable for it to invest in I 2t. This result 
conforms with the balanced investment assumption discussed earlier. If it 
was socially desirable for the government to invest in either of the other two 
sectors, then it would also be desirable to invest in i 1t at the margin. 
If the assumption that V- = 0 is relaxed, but the requirement that 
I3t 
v- < 0 is retained, then it is immediately obvious from (101) that 
I3t -
(lOlb) 
and the social benefit derived from an additional unit of tax revenue must 
always be at least as great as the social benefit to be derived from an 
additional unit of private savings. This result follows because of the uni-
lateral transfer possibilities from the public budget to the private savings 
fund. If the marginal social benefit of private investment exceeds that of 
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public investment in SOC, the government simply invests in private capital in 
either sectors 2 or 3. The private investors allocate their investment funds 
in a manner taking full account of the government investments I 2t and I 3t. 
A model of dualistic economy is formulated in the next section. In it, 
the government has control over the allocation of private savings. In addition, 
it has the tax budget, which may be used for either investment in SOC or for 
additions to the private capital stock. Any income earned on the capital 
stock is invested in further capital accumulation. Thus, both private and 
public investments are controlled by the government. This model is termed the 
centralized dual-economy model. 
THE CENTRALIZED MODEL 
The decentralized model now is reformulated to simplify the first-order 
conditions for the maximum. The reformulation does not appreciably alter the 
basic features of the original model. The simplification facilitates the 
analysis of the optimum conditions. 
A Reformulation of the Model 
The modified decentralized model expands the role of the government 
planners to allocation of private investment funds to maximize the objective 
function. This modification simplifies the problem considerably and the 
restrictive assumption of balanced private investment in every period is re-
laxed. Investment in all three sectors during every period is not assumed. 
Some features of the model remain unchanged. One modification is the 
nature of provisions to assure adequate post-plan productive capacity. Incen-
tive to invest in the last plan period is induced through a modified welfare 
function. A positive weight is attached to post terminal productive capacity 
(GNP) evaluated at period T prices. Letting T = T + 1, the new welfare 
- 73 -
function is denoted as 
(104) 
Aside from the new parameter, 8, indicating the weight or emphasis 
placed on the provision for future generations, all parameters and variables 
are as defined earlier. The welfare function is maximized subject to the 
following set of constraints in each period (t = 1, ... , T). 
Yst 
\. 'll l"'f2 (105) = r; G tp L s s st st 
ylt 
A. 81 82 B·~ (106) = u 1GltP L Klt 
- lt lt -
t Yl Y2 Y] (107) y = r;2(l+E) ~2tL2tK2i 2t 
t r.o1r62K63 y3t = r;3(1+€) 3t "3t 3t (108) 
L = f, + 1'1t + L t + Llt + L2t + L3t (109) 0 st s 
Yst + ylt = clt (110) 
y2t = 
]:;' + Flt + ]:;' + p3t + c2t (111) st '2t. 
y3t = Ilt + I2t + 13t (112) 
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(113) 
rtlPltyst = p ( 114) 81 Plt_Y lt = p (115) st . 1t 
y y 
= F' (116) 01p3tylt = r.' (117) 1 2t 2t . 3t 
A2Plt y lt = Lltw ( 118) ,, v = L w (119) '2'2t 2t 
(120) 
(121) 
(122) 
> 1 
-
(123) > 1 (124) 
In addition, the following definitions apply to variables appearing in (106)-(10~: 
t-1 \125) t-1 -
G11 (126) Gst = Gsl + .>: T si (\t = + ;~ L1i i=l i:1 
-
t.-1 
I< 1 t = J\ + I: 11i t-1 1J ( 12 7) K2t K + ')' 12i (128) i=l = 21 i~1 
t-1 
Klt = K.n + 2: 13i. (12g) 
i=1 
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Many of these equations remain unchanged but are r~peated at this point 
for convenience. The principal difference between this model and the decen-
tralized model involves the role of the government in the investment sector. 
The government now is assumed to have control over the expenditure to be made 
from two budgets, the tax budget (113) and the savings budget (122). Revenue 
or purchasing power can be transferred from the tax budget to the savings 
budget to be used for the purchase of capital goods. The amount of the trans-
fer in each period is denoted as P3tit. However, private savings (income 
earned on capital goods) cannot be transferred to the tax budget. 
In every period, the government has control over the variables Lst' 1 lt' 
It, Ilt' I2t' and I 3 t. The placement of capital goods is no longer subject to 
the allocation rules outlined for the decentralized model and expressed in 
(43) and (44). As a consequence, the government in the present model has much 
more power and, hence, control over the development of the economy. 
The changes in (112) and definitions (128) and (129) relative to their 
counterparts in Chapter II are self explanatory. The modification of the wel-
fare function (102) is designed to provide an incentive to invest in produc-
tive capacity for the future by imputing a social value to the productive 
capacity bequeathed to subsequent generations. 
The First-Order Conditions 
The optimization of this model proceeds, as before, applying the Kuhn-
Tucker optimality conditions to the Lagrangean function formed with (104) as 
the maximand and (105)-(124) as the constraints. The definitions (125)-(128) 
are assumed to be eliminated by substitution but the variables defined are 
retained for notational convenience. Consequently, these equations do not 
appear in the Lagrangean function. Although the Lagrangean function is not 
presented, we let X denote Lagrangean multipliers and define T = T - 1. The 
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following first-order conditions result: 
v 
C1 
v 
r2 
Vy 
s 
( f). 1 - 2~ 11 c 1 +~-' 12 c 2 ) ( 1 + p ) -t --
( rJ 2 -H. ' 1 2 r 1 - 2u 2 2 c 2 ) ( 1 + r ) -t. == 
-- -Y 
'1 
'(_/ 
-
'( 
'R 
v 
'18 pl + '(20 = 0 
v v 0 
- '\. + 
''"21 -H; 
V == _v + X,) + X ~(1-v ) -X .v + X _v +X (l-V)Y2 VL '4 tJ 10 1 1 ~ l lb 2 18 
(130) 
(131) 
(133) 
(134) 
V y == -'\C) + Xg + p 1 l :< 1 () IJ ( 1 - .~ l ) - X 1 4 S l + X l 7 6 2 + X 18 ( 1- ) 6 2 
1 
(135) 
v = V ,._ Y /P - v + v == 0 ( j =1, ·r -1) '2 'l ' ' ·a '\ 11 . . . 
' 
!..' 
- s s s 
(136) 
V,~ = v l y ;r.· - '( + X12 = () (t:l, T-1) '3 1 1 '} fl . . . , 1 
(137) 
v = \T '( y /[' -xn -I- v = () (1-_ = 1 T -1 ) F2 '4 l 2 ,• 2 ·n ' . . . ' (138) 
V = '<r::I) 1Y /r 1 - X. + -..c = 0 (t=l, ••• , 1-l) ;:.• 3 _) :1 ) R JtJ (139) 
v = X2"~2 Y s/J.s - v = 0 (t=l, T-1) L \6 . . . , 
s 
(140) 
,, 
= '(_3 ~2 y 1/T.l - '( -'-( ;;; = 0 (t:l, . . . 
' 
T-1) 
Ll 6 I'S 
(141) 
'l = v I L2 ·,f' 2 y 2 T '2 - '( 6 V IJI == () ( t 1 T 1 ) . ] 6 -= ' ••• ' - (142) 
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(143) 
Vpl = Xl_()~lY~(l--v) -~ Y 1 (1-8 1 )1 -X ry Y - x12 8 Y1 s 1 . 11 1 s 1 . 
"-L 
st 
(144) 
(t:::l, ... , T-1) 
= 0 (t:::l, ••• , 1-1) (145) 
T 
. :-= ( X 2 i Ys 1. I G · ) 
l=t+l . Sl 
- -
+ lv(l-\if)('\Hlt- xlnt_):; O; r '-'- = O; Lst > o 
st Lst 
T 
. ~ <x3iyli/cli) -x6t 
l=t+l 
- -
(146) 
(147) 
+ W(1-~)('(H3t- 'ClOt):: 0; LltVf1t = 0; L1t > 0 (148) 
T 
- X P < 0; I V 0 I > 0 ]. 9 t "- t_ --1 t r· = ; -1 t ;_ > . ~ 1 t (149) 
T 
+ '! 3 
- X: P < 0·, T V 
' 1tJt. 3 2 I t t 2t 
(150) 
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The following special conditions apply to the final period of the plan. 
A. ll'l -1 "·2 
= qp ~lcr G mF 'T L lT S S1 S ST 
-- 0 
= 0 
= 0 
- A 
(151) 
= 0 (136a) 
(137a) 
(138a) 
(139a) 
(140a) 
(14la) 
v 
L3T 
- X UJ l6T 
- X w = 0 17T 
- I 
2T 
- c 1 
lT 
I } = 0 
3r 
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(142a) 
(143a) 
(144a) 
(145a) 
With the letter X denoting the Lagrangean multipliers, the subscripts on the 
multipliers indicate the equations and time period with which they are associ-
a ted. 
SOC Accumulation 
If in any period t, it is desirable for the government to invest in 
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subsistence sector SOC from (147) we have the result 
,. 
~ (X2 1·Y ./G . ) - (X - X )(1-·)W + X S1 81 - lOt 18t 6t, i=t+l 
(146a) 
where x2i represents the social marginal value of additional subsistence agri-
cultural production in period i > t, x18t is the marginal social value of 
additional consumer. income generated in period t by employing labor in SOC 
accumulation, and x6t and x10t represent the social opportunity costs of labor 
and government purchasing power, respectively. 
Comparing (146a) with its analogue (90) obtained earlier for the decen-
tralized model, the only difference between the two is that the first term in 
(146a) is absent from (99). This tei:m represents the value that society places 
on the marginal value productivity of SOC in postplan productive capacity for 
the subsistence sector. Since this term is positive, the socially desirability 
of investing in SOC for sector s is greater, when capacity has a positive 
value, than in the decentralized model where the social value of terminal 
productive capacity is not considered. 
Turning now to the commercial agricultural sector, the condition that 
must be satisfied if Llt is to be positive is 
+ w ( 1-w) (X lOt - x18t). (147a) 
Comparing (147a) with (146a), we see that society can be indifferent between 
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the post-terminal marginal productivity of SOC in the two agricu4tural eectors 
since the same valuation (ePlT) is applied to both. 
Some simplifying assumptions and notation 
To simplify notation in the remainder of this section, let T 
define the following variables: 
and 
= p A = lT 
T + 1 and 
(152) 
(153) 
(154) 
Making the appropriate substitutions into (146a) and (147a), we get84 
and 
T 
\ 2: (X y ./G si) = x6t + (XlOt X )(1-~)W (155) i=t+l 2i Sl 18t 
'T' 
>.. 2: (X3iyli/Gli) = x6t + (X lOt - xl8t)(l-$)w. (156) 
84 
i:t+l 
If the planning horizon is extended to T + 1 periods, values for F ST 
and LST become "competitively" determined, along with a corresponding output of 
YST' If we assume that FST = F , and that L ~ L , the variable defined in ST ST ST 
(153) is approximately equal to YST' as it would be if determined competitively. 
The same considerations apply to (152). 
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From (155) and (156) it is evident that the decision to invest in SOC 
in either the subsistence or commercial agricultural sector depends on which 
of two weighted sums of two sets of ratios is larger, These ratios are the 
output/SOC ratios in each sector. Further, the weights applied to the ratios 
of the two sectors in each period are the same. That is, 
x2t = x3t (t~l, ...• T + 1) (157) 
since x2t is the marginal social value of agricultural production in the 
subsistence sector and x3t is the same quantity in the commercial agricultural 
sector, These two quantities must be equal since agricultural goods produced 
by the two sectors are perfect consumption substitutes. Thus, the decision to 
invest in SOC for either sect9r involves a comparison of two sets of ratios, 
Y1 ./G1 . andY ./G . (i = t+l, .•• , T + 1). These ratios and their influences 1 1 S1 51 
on the two sums in (155) and (156) mainly are the subject of the remainder of 
this section. 
In dual economies, a substantial portion of the labor force usually is 
employed in subsistence agriculture and Lst > Llt' Since the total labor 
supply is assumed fixed and perfectly inelastic and L as a residual, it 
st 
follows that as the supply of labor available for employment in the subsis-
tence sector declines, or L < L , i > 0, as the economy develops. 
s,t+i st 
Assuming for now that the terms of trade (TT) between agricultural and manu-
factured goods remain constant and that no investment in subsistence SOC occurs 
in the first t periods (that is, Lsi= 0, i=l, ... , t), then 
(158) 
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since G 1 = G . and Y 1 > Y . because L . < L 1 . From (llS) and the auump-s Sl. S - Sl. Sl. - S 
tion of constant TT, the effect of purchased manufactured inputs cannot pff-
set the effect of the decrease in the labor employed in the subsistence sector. 
Turning to the commercial agriculture, assume constant TT and no invest~ 
ment in SOC in the first t periods. Thus Gli = G11 since Lli = 0, i~l, ·~·• t. 
If there has been no investment in private capital in the agric~ltural sector 
in the first t periods (that is, r 1i = 0, i=l, •.• , t), then Kl,t+l = K11 , Com-
bining the assumptions of no private or public investment in the first t 
periods with the constant terms of trade assumption implies that 111 "' Lli and 
F11 = Fli' and therefore, that 
(159) 
The results in (158) and (159) suggest that the apsolute ~ q£ decline 
of the social value of subsistence SOC diminishes over time relative tp the 
absolute rate of decline of the social value of commercial SOC. This can be 
delllonstrated as follows. Define the two sums in (155) and (156) as 
T+l 
-;~ (X , y . /G . ) 
· t. l 21 Sl 51 
l = --~ 
(160) 
,.._'" 1 
and E\ = . z ( x3 i Y1 ./G1 . ) • · (161) l=t+l l. ' ~ 
The absolute rates of decline of these sums between periods t-1 and t are 
(162) and 
Forming a ratio of these differences and examining the ratio over time where 
i > t 
(X Y /G 
2t st st' 
(X y . jr-, 
~t 1 t 1 t 
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(X y /r. 
> 2i s.i si 
{ '{ y /G ) ' 
3'i li li 
(164) 
with the strict inequality holding if L declines over time. The significance 
st 
of (164) is d{scussed after the implications of some of the foregoing simpli-
fying assumptions are examined. 
Relaxing the simplifying assumptions 
Relaxing the assumption that no investment of private capital has taken 
place in commercial agriculture merely augments the result expressed in (164). 
If investment occurs in commercial agriculture, then (159) is modified to 
become 
(159a) 
Next, relaxing the assumption that the TT are constant and assuming that 
the TT move in favor of agriculture (Pl,t+i > Plt' i > O) has simi~ar effect 
on (159) since at the higher prices more commercial agricultural production will 
be forthcoming. Changing of the TT over time, however, has an additional in-
fluence on the ratios in (164) via the response of subsistence production to 
price changes. If the subsistence response is perverse, this tends to augment 
the inequality expressed in (158) and, consequently also contributes to the 
decline of the ratios in (164). On the other hand, if supply response is 
positive, this would tend to offset the influence of the natural outflow of 
labor from the subsistence sector as the "rest of the economy develops." For 
present purposes, assume that, if the supply response is positive, this posi-
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tive response is not sufficient to offset the effect of the outflow of labor. 
Thus, even if the TT move in favor of agriculture, Y . will decline in the 
s~ 
absence of investment in suosistence soc. 
The remaining possibility is the case where the TT move against the 
agricultural sectors. Retaining the assumption of no investment in SOC, con-
sider first the case where there is no investment in private capital in the 
commercial agricultural sector. If there is no investment in agriculture and 
the price of agricultural goods declines, the output of agricultural goods 
must fall by nature of the aggregate supply response in these sectors. Not 
only is this unlikely to occur (because of the nature of the relative marginal 
social utilities discussed earlier), but also the possibility of aggregate 
agricultural production falling below the initial output level is explicitly 
excluded by (123). Therefore, if the price of agricultural goods declines, 
this decline must be the result of expanded production and not the cause of 
decreased output. Expanded output of agricultural goods concurrent with 
declining prices can occur only if there is investment in either SOC or in 
private commercial capital goods. Thus, if the TT are moving against the 
agricultural sector and there has not been any investment in SOC, then there 
must be investment in private commercial agricultural capital. This means 
that aggregate production is increasing in the face of declining prices. In 
this situation, Yst/Gst must be declining while Y1t/G1t is increasing. This 
is precisely the same set of results obtained under the assumptions of 
private investment with constant TT and thus the results are the same as in 
(164). 
The significance of At and Bt 
Turning now to the implications of (164), this inequality suggests that 
the absolute rate of decline of At over time decreases relative to the 
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absolute rate of decline of Bt. Assume again, for the moment, that the TT are 
constant and that no investment is occurring in private capital in the commer-
cial sector. Assume further that x2t = x3t is constant over time. These as-
sumptions suggest that Bt declines. at a constant absolute rate while the 
absolute rate of decline of At decreases. 
Plotting At and Bt on a graph (where time is treated as a continuum) 
leads to six possibilities, five of which are shown on Figure 4 (p. 87): 
(a) At is always above Bt and the curves do not cross; (b) Bt is always above 
At and the curves do not cross; (c) At crosses Bt once from below; (d) At 
crosses Bt once from above; and (e) At crosses Bt twice, first from above and 
then from below. The sixth possibility is that the curves touch (become tan-
gent) but do not cross. 
Relaxing the assumption about investing in private commercial agriculture 
and allowing the TT to move in favor of agricultural goods has the effect of 
allowing Y1t/Glt to increase over time, and the influence of (159a) replaces 
(159) in determining the rates of decline expressed in (164). Graphically, 
this simply has the effect of bending the straight line Bt so that it becomes 
strictly concave downward. The net result is that the range of possibilities 
with respect to crossing combinations remains unchanged. Furthermore, it is 
asserted that relaxing the assumption that x2t = x3t is constant has no essen-
tial influence on the nature of the crossing possibilities since allowing 
these values to vary over time simply changes the curvature of the two curves 
and does not alter the number of crossing possibilities. 
The criterion involved in the decision of whether to invest in one or 
both of subsistence and commercial agriculture is the magnitude of AAt and 
ABt relative to the social opportunity cost of using government funds in al-
ternative uses as expressed in (155) and (156). In terms of Figure 4, this 
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Figure 4 At and Bt with assumptions of no investment and constant TT 
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means that, if the social opportunity cost in any one period is sufficiently 
low, investment may occur in one or both of the SOC alternatives. The case 
where it is socially desir~ble to invest in commercial SOC is illustrated in 
Figure 5 (p. 98), where Ct denotes the net social-opportunity cost as defined 
by the right hand side of (155) or (156). The At and Bt curves represent only 
one of the possibilities with respect to relative locations. At time t=t', 
the social benefit to be derived (at the margin) from investing in SOC in 
com~ercial agriculture exceeds that of investing in subsistence SOC. If, as 
illustrated, the value of C , lies between B 1 and A,, then it is socially t t t 
desirable to invest in commercial SOC but not in subsistence SOC in period t'. 
If Ct 1 was less than At'' then it would be desirable to invest in SOC in both 
sectors. These considerations exemplify the importance of the relative loca-
tion of the At and Bt curves. 
In discussing the possible shapes of the two curves it was assumed that 
no investment in SOC would take place. When this assumption is relaxed, the 
problem becomes slightly more complicated because the curves begin to shift. 
Consider the following case, which is illustrated for time t' in Figure 5. 
Given the positions of the At and Bt curves relative to Ct'' it is desirable 
to invest in commercial SOC in period t'. Such an investment, however, shifts 
the location of the Bt curve since, by definition, Bt is a weighted average of 
the ratio of commercial production to commercial SOC. Increasing the value of 
the denominator in this ratio tends to shift the curve downwards. The down-
ward influence, however, is partially offset by the increase in output of 
commercial agriculture associated with the increased SOC and the correspond-
ingly higher level of purchased manufactured and labor inputs. The effect is 
that the ratio Ylt/Glt must fall if Glt is increased because of the diminishing 
marginal productivity of SOC. 
Expanded commercial sector SOC has a further downward influence on Bt. 
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Figure 5. The decision to invest in SOC 
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Expanded agricultural output results in a decline in the marginal social value 
of agricultural goods in all subsequent periods, and it is this value (x3t) 
that forms the weights in Bt. Since the marginal social value of agricultural 
output is the same for the commercial and subsistence sectors, investment in 
commercial SOC also tends to shift the At curve downward. 
Turning now to the question of the extent of the downward shift, Bt must 
continue to shift downward until the value of Bt' falls to the level Ct,. 
This is apparent from (154). If there are sufficient government funds avail-
able to drive Bt as low as At'' then simultaneous investment in both subsis-
tence and commercial SOC becomes socially desirable. Thus, if in any period 
t, investment occurs in both Gs,t+l and c1 , t+l' then At= Bt as is apparent 
from (155) and (156). 
Economic considerations influencing the desirability of investing in subsis-
tence versus commercial SOC 
Having discussed the general shape and the importance of the relative 
locations of the At and Bt curves, we now examine the economic factors which 
determine the relative locations of these curves and attempt to isolate 
features of dualistic economies which make one curve lie above (or below) the 
other. In discussing the determinants of the location of these curves, it is 
preferable to start with the terminal period of the plan (T) and work towards 
the start of the planning period since the value of At includes all the terms 
of A+. (i > 0) plus some additional terms. 
t ~ 
Letting T = T + 1, it is apparent from (152)-(154), (160), and (161) that 
(160a) (16la) 
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It is the relative magnitude of these two terms that determines the relative 
values of the ordinates corresponding to the abscissa value of T + 1 for the 
two curves At and Bt in Figures 4 and 5. Since we are only interested in 
relative magnitude, the common factors P1Te can be ignored. 
With the production function intercepts presented earlier, we have 
crs = ~sB~4 and cr1 = cr1B~4 where Bs and B1 are the quantities of land in the subsis-
tence and commercial agricultural sectors, respectively. The relative size of 
Bs and B1 will vary greatly from country to country. The portion of the land 
that is farmed by mechanized means in many of the underdeveloped countries, 
however, is small relative to that which is farmed by traditional means. 
Since the land in the traditional sector frequently is more intensively farmed 
than land in plantations or larger units, we assumed that the productivity of 
land in the subsistence sector is higher than in the commercial sector. 
Another interpretation is that the share of the output attributable to land 
(a4) is larger in the subsistence sector than in the commercial sector (~4). 
Based on these assumptions, we have 
(165) 
If the commercial sector uses modern and more productive techniques than 
the subsistence sector, the influence of land will be offset to some extent by 
the larger "index of technology." In other words, ~s < 0:1 because more modern 
and efficient practices are being used on commercial farms. An additional 
offsetting factor is the influence of mechanization in the commercial sector. 
This influence is represented by K~i· From (21) and (23) we have ~ 2Y1t/Llt > 
(a2 + a 4)Yst/Lst' and since ~ 2 < (a2 + a 4), it follows that Y1t/Llt > Yst/Lst" 
Even though it is assumed that Lst > Llt' since a 2 < ~ 2 it is impossible to 
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Cc'2 ~2 determine on the basis of these assumptions, whether Lst exceeds Llt in any 
particular period. Finally, from (115) and (116) and the assumption that 
Cc'l = ~1' it 
FCc'l a d F~ 1 
st n lt 
follows that Y1t/Flt = Yst/Fst' Consequently, the magnitudes of 
are proportional to the relative magnitudes of Y and Y1 . st t 
Bringing these considerations together, it follows that the larger the 
relative size of the subsistence labor force relative to the commercial labor 
Cc'4 force, the larger A~ will be relative to B~. Similarly, the larger Bs rela-
tive to B~4 , the larger~ will tend to be relative to B~. Counterbalancing 
these two items, the larger the capital stock in commercial agriculture (K1T) 
and the greater the disparity between the productivity of subsistence and 
commercial techniques (crs versus cr1), the larger B~ will tend to be relative 
to ~· The influence of purchased inputs varies with the relative size 
(measured in terms of output) of the two sectors. Thus, the relative values 
of A~ and B~ vary directly with the relative sizes of all the foregoing factors. 
The only exception is the size of GsT compared with GlT' The relative sizes 
of A and B vary inversely with the relative quantities of SOC available in 
~ ~ 
the two sectors. 
Why are we concerned with the values of A~ and B~ since these are terminal 
values and no further investment in SOC can occur during the plan? The reason 
is that A~ and B~ form the base for all earlier values of At and Bt. This 
becomes obvious when A 1 and B 1 are considered. We have from (162) for the ~- ~-
subsistence sector 
A.r-1 x2 Y /G + A ~ s~ s~ ~ 
and, from (163), for the commercial sec tor 
B ~-1 
(160b) 
(16lb) 
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Thus, the larger A~ relative to B~, the larger A~-l will be relative to B~_ 1 • 
In comparing the two additional terms in (160b) and (16lb), the same factors 
of components have the same influence as in A~ and B~. This becomes obvious 
when these terms are rewritten as 
Finally, replacing~ by tin (166) and (167), it is obvious that the same 
variables and parameters have similar influences throughout the entire period. 
PRIVATE CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
The allocation of private investment funds in this model is governed by 
the criterion of social desirability. This criterion differs from the cri-
terion (maximization of the expected income earned on the capital stock in 
the subsequent period) used in the decentralized model. The application of 
the social desirability criterion to the investment alternatives is summarized 
in the first-order conditions (149)-(151). The social desirability of trans-
ferring revenue from the tax budget to the private savings budget is summarized 
in condition (146). 
The relative social desirability of investment alternatives 
To simplify the analysis, notation similar to that used in the previous 
section is introduced. Letting T = ~ + 1, define 
X5T = Ps~~, (169) 
T vl y2 y3-l 
C12(l+€) F2-rL2~K2'T' = y2T/K2T' (170) 
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and 
(171) 
Using this notation and the definitions of x3T and YlT in (152) and (154), 
we can rewrite parts of the conditions in (149)-(151) in simplified form as 
T 
83 !: ( X3 i y li/Kli) s_ Xgt + x19tP3t (149a) 
i=t+l 
T 
v3 I.: (X4iy2i/K2i) < Xgt + x19tP3t (150a) i=t+l 
T 
53 I.: (X5iy3i/K3i) < Xgt + x19tP 3t" (15la) 
i=t+l 
The remainder of the conditions in (149) require that if investment in K1 t+l 
' 
is to be desirable in period t (i.e., it is deemed desirable for r1t to be 
positive), then the LHS of (149a) must be equal in magnitude to the RHS of 
(149a). In other words, if investment is socially desirable in period t, 
then the discounted present marginal social value productivity of private 
capital in commercial agriculture in all successive periods, plus the social 
value of post-plan productive capacity, must be equal to the social-opportun-
ity costs of using investment goods and private savings in this manner. Sim-
ilar interpretations apply to (150a) and (15la). 
Economic factors affecting private investment 
Making detailed comparisons among the desirability of the three private 
investment alternatives is more difficult than analyzing the two alternatives 
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available for investment in SOC. This enhanced difficulty results from the 
greater asymmetry involved in the choices among the private investment alter-
natives. One troublesome &spect of this asymmetry is that the products pro-
duced by the three sectors all have their own marginal social value. Thus, 
comparison among physical characteristics is no longer sufficient as in the 
decision between investing in either G1 or Gs. The relative values of x3t, 
x4t, and x5t must be considered in comparing the relative magnitudes of the 
LHS of (149a)-(15la). 
The allocation of the private savings among the three alternative sectors 
requires that investment must occur in at least one of these sectors in every 
period. This differs from the problem of deciding between G1 and G2 for SOC 
investment. In the allocation of government funds, it was possible that in-
vestment might not occur in either G1 or Gs in a particular period since the 
entire tax budget could be transferred to the private savings fund and used 
to accumulate private capital. No similar transfer option is possible for 
private savings. Consequently capital must be accumulated in at least one 
sector. Thus, the social opportunity cost of placing capital (X9t + x19tP3t) 
cannot exceed the largest of the terms on the LHS of conditions (149a)-(15la). 
If investment occurs in more than one sector, the values of the LHS of the 
conditions (149a)-(15la) corresponding to these sectors must be equal. In-
vestment, however, will be socially desirable only in those sectors for which 
the value of the LHS of the conditions equals the social opportunity cost. 
This equality will prevail only in those sectors with the larger values on 
the LHS. Thus, it becomes important to determine which economic factors con-
tribute to increasing the value of the LHS of the conditions. 
The share of capital One of the more obvious elements to be considered is 
the relative magnitudes of the three parameters S3 , y3 , and o3 . From (149a) 
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-(15la) it is obvious that the larger any one of these parameters is relative 
to the other two, the relatively more desirable it becomes to have a higher 
(rather than lower) capital;output ratio in that sector. In other words, the 
larger the share of output attributable to capital in a particular sector, 
the higher the optimum capital:output ratio becomes relative to other sectors. 
Social valuation of outputs The desirability of increasing the capital: 
output ratio in the various sectors is strongly influenced by the social 
values attached to the outputs of the three sectors x3 , x4 , and x5 • The 
social value of capital-goods production (X5) is an indirect or imputed social 
value since capital goods do not enter the welfare function directly except in 
the evaluation of post-terminal productive capacity. Since in this model, 
capital goods are not consumed, production of capital goods is socially de-
sirable only from the standpoint of the increased production and consumption 
of agricultural and manufactured goods made possible through the accumulation 
of capital in subsequent periods. At the other extreme, agricultural output 
is used for consumption purposes only. Consequently, the social value of 
agricultural production is derived strictly from direct consumption benefits, 
and no indirect value is imputed to agricultural production in this model. 
Between the extremes exemplified by agricultural and capital goods is the 
social value of manufactured production. Since manufactured goods are used 
both for consumption and as a factor of production, x4 contains elements of 
both direct and indirect social value. The differences in the nature of the 
social values of the products of these sectors results from the different 
contributions the three types of output make to social welfare. A positive 
social value on capital goods production expresses a concern for expanded 
future consumption, while a positive value for agricultural or manufacturing 
production expresses a concern for present welfare. 
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In summary, during the initial periods of the plan it may be expected 
that x2t = X3t > x4t. But, the magnitude of this inequality will decrease 
over time unless the production of manufactured goods expands sufficiently 
rapidly relative to agricultural production so that the c1t/c2t declines 
enough to offset the different rates at which the marginal welfares diminish. 
It is more difficult to make meaningful comparisons of x5t and x3t or 
x4t than to make comparisons between x3t and x4t. Comparisons involving XSt 
require consideration of the social value of present versus future consumption 
since the value of x5t is an imputed value derived from the expansion of con-
sumption of manufactured and agricultural goods. An intertemporal problem 
arises because the social payoff for production of capital goods in period t 
cannot be realized as expanded consumption before period t + 1. Thus, if 
society places a higher premium on present consumption relative to future 
consumption, the value of x5 will be lower. The magnitude of x5t is strongly 
influenced by the social rate of discount, p, to be chosen by the policy-maker 
to reflect society's intertemporal preferences with respect to consumption. 
An increase in the social rate of discount will result in a decline in the 
social value of capital accumulation, x5 • The other parameter in the model, 
which reflects society's intertemporal preferences, is the weight given to 
post-plan productive capacity, 9. This terminal productive capacity must, to 
some extent, be acquired at the expense of current consumption. Consequently, 
an increase in the magnitude of e leads to a concomitant increase in the social 
value of capital goods production, x5 . Thus, the value of x5 is determined to 
a large extent by the social rate of discount and the relative emphasis given 
to terminal productive capacity. Finally, the problem of comparing the rela-
tive magnitudes of x3 and x4 with x5 involves such diverse considerations such 
as levels of production of the three goods as well as the relative rates of 
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expansion of Clt and c2t. The most difficult problem, however, arises from 
the intertemporal aspects of current versus delayed consumption. 
The rate of technical change and SOC accumulation The only terms on the 
left-hand side of (148a)-(152a) remaining to be considered are the output/ 
capital ratios. From (106)-(108) we have 
Ylt/Klt = A. B1 s 2 83/ alGltFltLltKlt Klt' (172) 
y2t/K2t 
t v1 v2 v3 
= rj2 ( 1+€) p2tL2tK2t/K2t' (173) 
and 
y3t/K3t 
t 51 02 63 
= rr3 (1+€) F3tL K 3~/K . (174) 
' 3t .. .. 3t 
Since the numerators of the ratios in (172)-(174) involve different units of 
account, the only meaningful comparisons among them involve factors that change 
the relative magnitudes of these ratios over time. 
The most obvious factor is the rate of technical change, e, in the manu-
facturing and capital goods sector relative to the rate of SOC accumulation 
in connnercial agriculture. The "effective" rate of SOC accumulation is 
)._ 
- (; ~lt 
= 
L lt 
t-1 
>.: Lli 
i=l 
> 0 (175) 
Since e > 0, the productive influence of SOC accumulation in connnercial agricul-
·ture may be greater than, equal to, or less than the exogenous rate of technical 
change in the manufacturing and capital goods sectors. Denote the LHS of (175) 
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as ~G/G. If ~G/G > e, then private capital accumulation in the agricultural 
sector is relatively more desirable than if ~G/G < e, the larger the rate of 
increase of the output:capttal ratio in a sector, the relatively more desirable 
it will be to expand the capital stock in that sector. While e is a constant, 
~G/G may vary over time. Consequently SOC accumulation will have a varied 
influence over time on the relative desirability of private investment in 
commercial agriculture. 
Changes in the terms of trade The remaining elements in (172)-(174) that 
can alter the output:capital ratios are the inputs of manufactured goods and 
labor. From (115)-(121) it is apparent that the influence of these factors is 
determined over time by TT. Since P2t = 1, the output:capital ratio in the 
manufacturing sector may be treated as a numeraire. If Plt increases over 
time, it will become profitable to employ larger amounts of labor and manu-
factured inputs in this sector, which will tend to increase Y1t/Klt relative 
Y2t/K2t. This increase in the output:capital ratio in commercial agriculture 
will tend to make investment in this sector relatively more desirable than 
investment in manufacturing. The opposite result ensues if Plt declines over 
time. Similarly, changes in P3t over time will have analogous implications 
for the relative desirability of investing in the capital-goods sector. Thus, 
as the TT move in favor of a particular sector, this will tend to make invest-
ment in that sector socially more desirable because it becomes profitable to 
employ more variable factors of production in that sector. 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT VERSUS SOC ACCUMULATION 
The total funds available for SOC accumulation are the tax revenues col-
lected in the particular period. The government budget constraint is given in 
(113). The funds available for private capital accumulation are the income 
earned by the existing capital stock plus any funds transferred from the 
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government budget. The private savings budget is given in (123). The trans-
fer of funds from the government budget to the private savings budget must 
satisfy the first-order requirements in (146). These conditions may be re-
written as 
(146a) 
and require that the marginal social value of private capital investment (x19t) 
must not exceed the social value of a marginal increment in SOC accumulation 
(x10t). This relationship can be maintained by transferring government funds 
to the private savings budget if the social pay-off to private savings exceeds 
that to SOC accumulation. Furthermore, the marginal social value of invest-
ment in these two alternatives must be equal if transfer of funds from the 
government to the private budget is desirable. 
Suppose that Lst' It, and Ilt are all positive in period t, then (115) 
will be satisfied and the left side of (149a) will equal the right side. In 
addition, we have x19t = x10t. Eliminating these two variables from (147a) 
and (155), we have 
= 
and the marginal social benefit of private investment in commercial agriculture 
must equal that for SOC accumulation in the subsistence sector. Relaxing the 
assumption that I is positive weakens (176) so that LHS < RHS. 
t -
Turning to the interpretation of individual terms in (176), the first 
(176) 
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left term represents the discounted marginal value productivity of private 
capital stocks in commercial agricultural production in subsequent periods of 
the plan, deflated by the price of investment goods in period t. The second 
term on the left of it is the social opportunity cost of so using investment 
goods in period t, deflated by the cost of purchasing these goods. The first 
term on the right indicates the present social marginal-value productivity of 
SOC in subsistence agriculture production in subsequent periods of the plan 
per unit of net government labor cost. The second term is the social oppor-
tunity cost (per unit of government purchasing power) of using labor for SOC 
accumulation in period t. Finally, the last term on the right is the marginal 
social benefit derived from the increased consumer income resulting from the 
employment of labor in SOC accumulation. 
The relative importance of the social opportunity cost of using capital 
goods per unit of private savings expended (X9t/P3t) and the social opportunity 
cost of using labor per unit of government expenditure (X6t/{l-~}W) will be 
influenced by the capacity of the capital goods industry and the size of the 
labor force. As the capacity of the capital goods industry increases relative 
to the size of the labor force, the social opportunity cost of using invest-
ment goods will decline relative to the social opportunity cost of using labor. 
This suggests the transfer of funds from the government budget to the private 
savings budget will be relatively more attractive in an economy that has a 
larger productive capacity in the capital goods industry. The opposite, of 
course, is true in an economy that has relatively more labor in proportion to 
capital goods capacity. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID 
Foreign aid can take various forms and can be put to alternative uses by 
the recipient country. One principal reason for aid is assistance to the 
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recipient country in economic development. Another is short-run relief in 
emergencies. Frequently, however, the form of the aid and the conditions 
under which it is provided are geared to benefit to the donor country. 
The models in this study do not allow an analysis of loan repayment for 
aid. However, outright gifts of specific commodities to the recipient coun-
tries can be analyzed. Since one of the principal forms of commodity aid has 
been in the form of food, the major portion of this section is concerned with 
a "comparative statics" analysis of a grant of food aid in one time period on 
the recipient country. Alternative methods of utilizing and distributing the 
food are analyzed. Some implications for other forms of commodity aid are 
drawn and some intertemporal considerations on development and resource allo-
cation are discussed. 
Three methods of food distribution are considered. The first and simplest 
is when food is given as a grant to the consumer. Under the second method 
considered, food is used by the government as wages in kind in the development 
of SOC. Under the third distribution method is the case where the government 
sells the food and then uses the market revenue, as indistinguishable from tax 
revenue. The economic consequences of these three alternative distribution 
methods are analyzed within the framework of a partial equilibrium model. 
Grants of Food to Consumers 
Outright grants to consumers are assumed to be made for humanitarian 
reasons. Recipient consumers do not pay for the food. The aggregate consumer 
budget is augmented by an amount equal to its value. Assuming changes in the 
output and prices of manufactured and capital goods resulting from food aid 
to have a negligible effect on consumer income, we denote the aggregate budget 
constraint as 
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(177) 
where I denotes aggregate cpnsumer income, P denotes the price of agricultural 
output (food), and A represents the amount of food aid. Since a large portion 
of the total labor force is employed in the agricultural sectors, consumer 
income is considered a function of the price and level of output (employment) 
in these sectors. 
Total demand for food is, given the population, a function of the relative 
price of food and consumer income. Thus, we have 
D f(P, I). (178) 
The total supply of food is the sum of domestic production and food aid, 
or 
S = h (P, L ) + A, 
s 
(179) 
where domestic supply is a function of the price and the amount of subsistence 
employment. For equilibrium it is required that D = S. To determine the 
effect of varying the amount of food aid, differentiate D = S with respect to · 
A and we get 
Of oP of I(Oo oP 1 
'5P oA + or l. 8P + A)ox + P oh oP = ~P OA + l. (180) 
If aid depresses the price of agricultural goods (oP/oA < 0), theoretically 
the total quantity of food purchased will not increase by the amount of the 
aid since an offsetting decline in domestic production will be determined by 
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the responsiveness of farmers to price changes and the responsiveness of 
prices to changes in the amount of aid. The latter will involve the responsive-
ness of (a) consumer demanQ for food to changes in prices and (b) the income 
changes resulting from price changes and grants of food aid. 
Multiplying both sides of D = S by P, differentiating with respect to A, 
and collecting terms we get 
( D + P.l\ + p Of + P Of oa) OP + p2 of 
op oi op OA oi 
oh bp 
= (S + P -) + P. (')p 0.2\ (181) 
Equation (181) indicated whether the total value of food tends to increase or 
decrease when the amount of aid is altered. If the sum of the terms on either 
side of the equation is negative, the total value of the food consumed decreases 
as the amount of aid increases. Dividing the left-hand side of (181) by D, 
we get 
· PI\ p b f Of OCT, l 
tl + D + D <O"P + OJ op' oP P
2 i'Jf 
OA + D or· (182) 
the term;(~+~~~) defines the price elasticity of demand for food which 
Mellor suggests is approximately -0.9 for low-income countries 138, p. 72]. 
Since 1 + ~A ~ 1 and ~! < 0, the term \ } ~ will be negative unless this 
price elasticity estimate is too low. The likelihood that this term is nega-
tive will increase as PDA increases. 2 The term R_ of will be positive unless 
n or 
food is an inferior good. Thus, if the term enclosed as \ } is positive, the 
likelihood that the total value of the food consumed decreases as the amount 
of food aid is increased will be larger as the proportion of total food repre-
sented as aid increases. In other words, an increase in the amount of aid is 
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expected to cause the total value of food consumed to decline as the ratio of 
food aid to domestic production increases. 
The principal effect o£ food aid as a grant is an increase in consumer 
welfare in the period of the aid. If the aid is a "once in a lifetime" effort 
and prices of agricultural goods are depressed for one period, a misallocation 
of private investment resources could result under the assumptions of the 
decentralized model. It also is conceivable that aid of this nature reduces 
the social value of marginal agricultural production (x2 and x3) in the cen-
tralized model. In case the government anticipated receiving this food aid, 
there would thus be a reduced incentive to invest in agricultural SOC in 
preceding periods relative to the incentive that would exist if no aid was 
anticipated. If the government planning authority anticipated receiving food 
aid throughout the duration of the planning period and no adjustments were 
made in the objectives of the plan, the resulting terminal capital structure 
also would differ (as compared with no aid received or anticipated). 
Food Aid for Work Projects or Wages in Kind 
Under this method of food distribution, recipients work on projects to 
earn food in the form of wages on SOC projects and laborers are from the 
subsistence sector. This method should reduce current agricultural production 
more than would food as a grant. 
The amount of labor that can be hired through the use of the food as 
wages in kind is 
and substituting into (12) we get 
(183) 
Thus, 
A oP 
s oA 
and from (179) we get 
~~ = (~~ 
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P oh 
g oL + 1 • 
s 
(184) 
(185) 
(186) 
where s = w (1 - ~) . Since oh/oL > 0 by assumption, the magnitude of (187) 
s 
must be less than the value of the right side of (181). Consequently, the 
price decrease resulting from this type of distribution must be less than that 
due to a simple food grant since the demand side of (182) remains unchanged. 
The intra-period price effect of this type of distribution food is smaller, 
than if the food is given as a grant, because domestic production falls to a 
greater extent as a result of labor transfer from the subsistence sector. 
The result is a relatively smaller pay-off as compared to a direct grant with-
in the period when food is used to employ labor on SOC work projects because 
consumption increases less than under a grant. In succeeding periods, however, 
there will be some additional social pay-off from the increased production 
possible because of the added SOC available for productive purposes. 
Market Sales of Food 
The centralized model discussed previously considers two alternative uses 
for additional government revenue when the recipient country sells the food in 
the open market. The added revenue can be used to employ labor for SOC 
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accumulation or to purchase capital goods for investment in private capital 
accumulation. The first of these two alternatives is identical with the 
"wages in kind distributio!' method" considered in the preceding section. 
The intraperiod consequences of using the revenue generated by food sales 
to purchase capital goods are more complex. The increased demand for capital 
goods will result in a higher price for capital goods. The result will be 
expanded production in this sector and a subsequent withdrawal of labor from 
the subsistence sector. Thus, (184) is replaced by 
(187) 
- -
where Ls and 11 may be zero. Differentiating (187) with respect to aid we get 
The absolute magnitude of (188) is expected to be less than that of (185) since 
the revenue from food sales also must cover expenses such as additional manu-
factured inputs and more hired labor. Differentiating (179) under these 
assumptions we have 
(189) 
The demand side of the system also requires modification since aggregate 
consumer income is no longer augmented by the value of the food aid. The 
additional food must be purchased out of income earned in other employment. 
Thus, equation (177) is replaced by 
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(190) 
where P3 is included becaus~ output and production in the capital goods sector 
must be considered. Differentiating (178) with respect to food aid we get 
= 
0 f 
oP1 
(191) 
Compare (189) with the right side of (182): ~ 'aL 'aP3 s1·nce ~ __ s > 0 
-- ' a 
oLs oP3 oA 
change in P resulting from aid will cause the change in the quantity produced 
domestically, plus the amount of aid, to be larger if the aid is distributed 
in the form of grants (rather than sold in the market and the revenue used to 
purchase capital goods). The chain of results is this: Since purchase of 
capital goods causes an expansion of capital goods production, labor will be 
drawn out of the subsistence sector. A leftward shift in the domestic supply 
curve then will occur. Make a similar comparison between (191) and the left 
side of (181). The change in the quantity consumed under food grants will be 
larger than when food is sold in the market. There is an obvious reason for 
this disparity. When food is given as a grant, effective consumer income 
increases by the value of the food aid. A rightward shift in the demand curve 
occurs. Food sold in the market results in a smaller income effect and, hence, 
a smaller rightward shift in the demand curve. The net implication of these 
two sets of relative changes is that the quantity of food consumed will in-
crease more when the aid is distributed in the form of grants than when it is 
sold in the market and the revenue so generated is used to purchase capital 
goods. The relative influence of the two distribution methods on the price of 
food will depend on the relative magnitudes of the demand and supply shifts. 
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Comparisons Among the Three Distribution Alternatives 
The intraperiod relationships among the prices and quantities of agri-
cultural goods under the three distribution methods are compared diagrammati-
cally as in Figure 6 (p. 110). Demand and supply curves in the absence of aid 
are represented by the curves D and S , respectively. They result in a price 
0 0 
of P and quantity consumed of Q . 
0 0 
Distributing food in the form of grants results in the largest shift in 
the supply curve since employment in the subsistence sector remains unchanged. 
Thus, S g S + A, where S represents the total supply curve and S represents 0 g 0 
the domestic supply curve that prevails if no aid is given. Since granting the 
food to consumers has the effect of bolstering consumer income, the demand 
schedule shifts to the right and becomes D • The resulting demand supply g 
curves give a price-quantity configuration where P < P and Q < Q . The g 0 0 g 
equilibrium price under grants will be lower than under no aid unless the 
marginal propensity to consume food out of income is unity. In other words, 
if the recipients of food grants divert some of the income previously spent 
on food to the consumption of non-food commodities, a drop in price will re-
sult. 
Turning now to the work projects form of distribution, the income effect 
is identical to that of grants, and D = D . The domestic supply curve will 
w g 
shift to the left since labor is transferred from the subsistence sector to 
SOC projects, but the shift is not sufficient to offset the influence of the 
85 
aid under the assumptions embodied in (21). Consequently, the equilibrium 
quantity consumed will increase and be greater than the quantity in the absence 
85 aY ~ a a2-1 From (6), (21) and (184), we get ___ s = -a2cr G F lL (f)> -1. aA s s s s s 
Thus, the leftward shift of the domestic supply curve is not sufficient to 
offset the rightward shift of the total supply curve by the aid, oA = 1 
aA · 
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pg 
D, S 
Figure 6. Prices and quantities of food consumed under alternative 
distribution methods 
- 111 -
of aid. The increase in quantity consumed, however, will be less than that 
realized when food is in the form of consumer grants. This leads to an equil-
ibrium, P and 0 , with P ~ P and Q < 0 < Q . 
w v 0 g 0 v g 
Food aid through sales in the market place with the revenue used to hire 
subsistence labor to work on SOC projects affects the economy exactly as if 
the food was distributed as wages in kind because the revenue earned from the 
sales is all paid out in wages. Thus, the effect on consumer income is the 
same as in the wages in kind distribution and exactly the same amount of labor 
can be hired from the subsistence sector leading to identical demand and supply 
shifts. If the revenue from government food sales is used to purchase capital 
goods, however, the domestic supply schedule for agricultural goods will shift 
to the left by a smaller amount than in the case of wages in kind distribution, 
as is evident from comparing (189) and the RHS of (181). The demand curve 
does not shift as much since all the additional food must be purchased out of 
income earned in employment. Thus, income is augmented only to the extent 
that the increased purchase of capital goods bids up the price of capital and, 
hence, leads to increased employment in the capital goods industry where the 
return to labor is higher than in the subsistence sector. This income effect 
is smaller than that experienced with the grants or wages in kind distribu-
tion methods. Hence, D must lie between D and D • For the same reason, the· 
s 0 w 
new supply schedule S must lie between S and S • The resulting equilibrium 
s w g 
price, P , and the quantity Q , have the properties that P > P > P and 
s s 0 w s 
Q < Q < Q • The equilibrium magnitude of P relative to P and Q relative 
0 s g s g s 
to Q will depend on the extent of the shifts in the supply and demand sced-
w 
ules. These orderings may change if labor hired in each case comes from an 
urban or rural pool of unemployed workers, and not from subsistence agricul-
· tural workers. 
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Based on the assumptions underlying this study, and with no insulation 
from the market, food aid should depress the price of agricultural goods, re-
gardless of the method of ~lstribution. Similarly, food aid will tend to 
reduce the social value of a marginal increment of agricultural expansion. If 
a country was assured of receiving a certain amount of food aid for several 
periods and the government anticipated this aid in formulating its development 
plan, the incentive to expand the productive capacity of the agricultural 
sectors would be less than if no food aid was anticipated. If the food aid 
terminated unexpectedly, the economy would probably have a somewhat different 
capital structure than if the termination of aid was foreseen. This suggests 
that, if an economy begins to rely on and to expect food aid, the economic 
incentives to develop the agricultural sectors are reduced. One way to insure 
that some development of these sectors does occur is to stipulate that the food 
must be used on work projects designed to assist in the development of agri-
culture. For example, the food could be used to develop an irrigation system 
or a rural road system to facilitate the marketing of produce. 
Commodity Aid in General 
Many effects of food aid discussed in the preceding section apply to any 
type of commodity aid that can be consumed directly. In terms of the models 
of this study, granting manufactured goods as aid would tend to move the terms 
of trade against that sector. Also, as long as a country is receiving this 
type of aid and expects to continue receiving it, there will be a reduced 
incentive to develop the sector. The social pay-off for expanding the pro-
ductive capacity is reduced because the commodity aid serves as a substitute. 
Stipulations such as these will be good policy, however, only if a measure of 
self-sufficiency in the production of the commodity is desirable. 
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